said that the Constitution declares the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint this officer. This, to be sure is very true, and so is the conclusion which an honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. White) drew from it—that an officer must be discharged in the way he was appointed.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, this question depends upon a just construction of a short clause in the Constitution—"The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States." Here is no difference with respect to the power of the President to make treaties and appoint officers, only it requires in the one case a larger majority to concur than in the other. I will not, by any means, suppose that gentlemen mean, when they argue in favor of removal by the President alone, to contemplate the extension of the power to the repeal of treaties; because, if they do, there will be little occasion for us to sit here. But, let me ask these gentlemen—as there is no real or imaginary distinction between the appointment of ambassadors and ministers, or secretaries of foreign affairs—whether they mean that the President should have the power of recalling or discarding ambassadors and military officers,—for the words in the Constitution are, "all other officers,"—as well as he can remove your secretary of foreign affairs. To be sure, they cannot extend it to the judges, because they are secured under a subsequent article, which declares they shall hold their offices during good behavior; they have an inheritance which they cannot be divested of but on conviction of some crime. But I presume gentlemen mean to apply it to all those who have not an inheritance in their offices. In this case, it takes the whole power of the President and Senate to create an officer; but half the power can uncreate him. Surely, a law passed by the whole legislature cannot be repealed by one branch of it; so, I conceive, in the case of appointments, it requires the same force to supersede an officer as to put him in office.
I acknowledge that the clause relative to impeachment is for the benefit of the people. It is intended to enable their representatives to bring a bad officer to justice, who is screened by the President. But I do not conceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Smith,) that it, by any means, excludes the usual ways of superseding officers. It is said, in the Constitution, that the house shall have the power of choosing their own officers. We have chosen a clerk, and, I am satisfied, a very capable one; but will any gentleman contend that we may not discharge him, and choose another, and another, as often as we see cause? And so it is in every other instance—where they have power to make, they have likewise the power to unmake. It will be said, by gentlemen, that the power to make does not imply the power of unmaking; but I believe they will find very few exceptions in the United States.
Were I to speak of the expediency, every one of my observations would be against it. When an important and confidential trust is placed in a man, it is worse than death to him to be displaced without cause; his reputation depends upon the single will of the President, who may ruin him on bare suspicion. Nay, a new President may turn him out on mere caprice, or in order to make room for a favorite. This contradicts all my notions of propriety; every thing of this sort should be done with due deliberation; every person ought to have a hearing before they are punished. It is on these considerations that I wish the general principle laid down by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. White) may be adhered to.
