Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/383

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1789.]
President's Power of Removal.Lawrence.
367

One gentleman (Mr. White) holds the same principles, but differs with respect to the power which ought to exercise the privilege of removal. On this point we are reduced to a matter of construction; but it is of high importance to the United States that a construction should be rightly made. But gentlemen say it is inconsistent with the Constitution to make this declaration; that, as the Constitution is silent, we ought not to be too explicit. The Constitution has expressly pointed out several matters which we can do, and some which we cannot; but in other matters it is silent, and leaves them to the discretion of the legislature. If this is not the case, why was the last clause of the 8th section of the 1st article inserted? It gives power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the government into effect.

I look upon it that the legislature have, therefore, a right to exercise their discretion on such questions; and, however attentively gentlemen may have examined the Constitution on this point, I trust they have discovered no clause which forbids this house interfering in business necessary and proper to carry the government into effect.

The Constitution grants expressly to the President the power of filling all vacancies during the recess of the Senate! This is a temporary power, like that of removal, and liable to very few of the objections which have been made. When the President has removed an officer, another must be appointed; but this cannot be done without the advice and consent of the Senate. Where, then, is the danger of the system of favoritism? The President, notwithstanding the supposed depravity of mankind, will hardly remove a worthy officer to make way for a person whom the Senate may reject. Another reason why the power of removal should be lodged with the President, rather than with the Senate, arises from their connection with the people. The President is the representative of the people; in a near and equal manner, he is the guardian of his country. The Senate are the representatives of the State legislatures; but they are very unequal in that representation: each state sends two members to that house, although their proportions are as ten to one. Hence arises a degree of insecurity to an impartial administration; but if they possessed every advantage of equality, they cannot be the proper body to inspect into the behavior of officers, because they have no constitutional powers for this purpose. It does not always imply criminality to be removed from office, because it may be proper to remove for other causes; neither do I see any danger which can result from the exercise of this power by the President, because the Senate is to be consulted in the appointment which is afterwards to take place. Under these circumstances, I repeat it, that I have no doubt, in my own mind, that this office is during pleasure; and that the power of removal, which is a mere temporary one, ought to be in the President, whose powers, taken together, are not very numerous, and the success of this government depends upon their being unimpaired.

Mr. LAWRENCE. It has been objected against this clause, that the granting of this power is unconstitutional. It was also objected, if it is not unconstitutional, it is unnecessary; that the Constitution must contain, in itself, the power of removal, and have given it to some body, or person, of the government, to be exercised; that, therefore, the law could make no disposition of it, and the attempt to grant it was unconstitutional: or the law is unnecessary;—for, if the power is granted in the way the clause supposes, the legislature can neither add to nor diminish the power by making the declaration.