Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/385

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1789.]
President's Power of Removal.Lawrence.
369

duties found in the Constitution, neither are we at liberty to extend the duties of the Senate beyond those precise points fixed in the same instrument: of course, if we cannot say the President alone shall remove, we cannot say the President and Senate may exercise such power.

It is admitted that the Constitution is silent on this subject; but it is also silent with respect to the appointments it has vested in the legislature. The Constitution declares that Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or heads of departments; yet says nothing with respect to the removal. Now, let us suppose the legislature to have vested the power of appointment in the President in cases of inferior offices; can the intention of the Constitution in this, (contemplating this mode of appointment for the sake of convenience,) be ever carried into effect if we say nothing respecting the removal? What would be the consequence if the legislature should not make the declaration? Could it be supposed that he would not have the authority to dismiss the officer he has so appointed? To be sure he could. Then, of course, in those cases in which the Constitution has given the appointment to the President, he must have the power of removal, for the sake of consistency; for no person will say that, if the President should appoint an inferior officer, he should not have the power to remove him when he thought proper, if no particular limitation was determined by the law. Thus stands the matter with respect to the Constitution. There is no express prohibition of the power, nor positive grant. If, then, we collect the power by inference from the Constitution, we shall find it pointed strongly in favor of the President, much more so than in favor of the Senate combined with him.

This is a case omitted, or it is not; if it is omitted, and the power is necessary and essential to the government, and to the great interests of the United States, who are to make the provision and supply the defect? Certainly the legislature is the proper body. It is declared they shall establish offices by law. The establishment of an office implies every thing relative to its formation, constitution, and termination; consequently, the Congress are authorized to declare their judgment on each of these points. But if the arguments of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) prevail, that, as the Constitution has not meditated the removal of an officer in any other way than by impeachment, it would be an assumption in Congress to vest the President, courts of law, or heads of departments, with power to dismiss their officers in any other mariner:—would a regulation of this kind be effectual to carry into effect the great objects of the Constitution? I contend it would not. Therefore, the principle which opposes the carrying of the Constitution into effect, must be rejected as dangerous and incompatible with the general welfare. Hence all those suppositions, that, because the Constitution is silent, the legislature must not supply the defect, are to be treated as chimeras and illusory inferences.

I believe it is possible that the Constitution may be misconstrued by the legislature; but will any gentleman contend that it is more probable that the Senate, one branch only of the legislature, should make a more upright decision on any point than the whole legislature,—especially on a point in which they are supposed by some gentlemen to be so immediately interested, even admitting that honorable body to have more wisdom and more integrity than this house? Such an inference can hardly be admitted. But I believe it seldom or never was so contended, that there was more wisdom or security in a part than in the whole.


vol. iv.47