this business, I presume they are to deliberate, because they are to advise and consent; if they are to deliberate, you put them between the officer and the President; they are then to inquire into the causes of removal; the President must produce his testimony. How is the question to be investigated?—because, I presume, there must be some rational rule for conducting this business.
Is the President to be sworn to declare the whole truth, and to bring forward facts? or are they to admit suspicion as testimony? or is the word of the President to be taken at all events? If so, this check is not of the least efficacy in nature. But if proof is necessary, what is then the consequence? Why, in nine cases out of ten, where the case is very clear to the mind of the President that the man ought to be removed, the effect cannot be produced; because it is absolutely impossible to produce the necessary evidence. Are the Senate to proceed without evidence? Some gentlemen contend not; then the object will be lost. Shall a man, under these circumstances, be saddled upon the President, who has been appointed for no other purpose, in the creation, but to aid the President in performing certain duties? Shall he be continued, I ask again, against the will of the President? If he is, where is the responsibility? Are you to look for it in the President, who has no control over the officer, no power to remove him if he acts unfeelingly or unfaithfully? Without you make him responsible, you weaken and destroy the strength and beauty of your system. What is to be done in cases which can only be known from a long acquaintance with the conduct of an officer? But so much has been said on this subject, that I will add no further observations upon it.
Let me ask, what will be the consequence of striking out these words? Is the officer to be continued during an indefinite time? for it has been contended that he cannot be removed but by impeachment. Others have contended that he is always in the power of them who appoint him. But who will undertake to remove him? Will the President undertake to exercise an authority which has been so much doubted here, and which will appear to be determined against him if we consent to strike out the words? Will the Senate undertake to exercise this power? I apprehend they will not. But if they should, would they not also be brought before the judges, to show by what authority they did it? because it is supposed by one gentleman, that the case might go before that tribunal, if the President alone removed the officer. But how is this to be done? Gentlemen tell you, the man who is displaced must apply for a mandamus to admit him to his office. I doubt much if this would be adequate to the purpose. It would be difficult to say whether the mandamus should be directed to the President, to the President and Senate, to the legislature, or to the people. Could the President be compelled to answer to a civil suit, for exercising the power vested in him by law and by the Constitution? The question upon either of those points would be involved in doubts and difficulties.
If these observations strike the committee in the same point of light, and with the same force, as they have struck my mind, they will proceed to determine the present question; and I Have no doubt but they will determine right.
Mr. LEE. I contend we have the power to modify the establishment of offices. So ought we, Mr. Chairman, to modify them in such a way as to promote the general welfare, which can only be done by keeping the three branches distinct; by informing the people where to look, in order to guard against improper executive acts. It is our duty, therefore, to vest
