Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/406

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390
President's Power of Removal.Boudinot.
[June 16,

tution, we ought not to modify the principle of the government so as to increase the evil complained of, by a further blending of the executive and legislative powers, and that too upon construction, when gentlemen deny that we ought to use construction in any case.

Now, let us take up the Constitution, and consider, from the terms and principles of it, in whom this power is vested. It is said by some gentlemen to be an omitted case. I shall take up the other principle, which is easier to be maintained,—that it is not an omitted case,—and say the power of removal is vested in the President. I shall also take up the principle laid down by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. White,) at the beginning of this argument, that, agreeably to the nature of all executive powers, it is right and proper that the person who appoints should remove. This leads me to consider in whom the appointment is vested by the Constitution. The President nominates and appoints: he is further expressly authorized to commission all officers. Now, does it appear, from this distribution of power, that the Senate appoints? Does an officer exercise powers by authority of the Senate? No. I believe the President is the person from whom he derives his authority. He appoints, but under a check. It is necessary to obtain the consent of the Senate; but after that is obtained, I ask, who appoints? who vests the officer with authority? who commissions him? The President does these acts by his sole power; but they are exercised in consequence of the advice of another branch of government. If, therefore, the officer receives his authority and commission from the President, surely the removal follows as coincident.

Now, let us examine whether this construction consists with the true interest of the United States and the general principles of the Constitution. It consists with the general principles of the Constitution, because the executive power is given to the President, and it is by reason of his incapacity that we are called upon to appoint assistants Mention, to be sure, is made of principal officers in departments; out it is from construction only that we derive our power to constitute this particular office. If we were not at liberty to modify the principles of the Constitution, I do not see how we could erect an office of foreign affairs. If we establish an office avowedly to aid the President, we leave the conduct of it to his discretion. Hence the whole executive is to be. left with him, agreeably to this maxim—All executive power shall be vested in a President. But how does this comport with the true interest of the United States? Let me ask gentlemen where they suspect danger. Is it not made expressly the duty of the secretary of foreign affairs to obey such orders as shall be given to him by the President? And would you keep in office a man who should refuse or neglect to do the duties assigned him? Is not the President responsible for the administration? He certainly is. How, then, can the public interest suffer?

Then, if we find it to be naturally inferred, from the principles of the Constitution, coincident with the nature of his duty, that this officer should be dependent upon him, and to the benefit of the United States, for what purpose shall Congress refuse a legislative declaration of the Constitution, and leave it to remain a doubtful point? Because, if Congress refuses to determine, we cannot conceive that others will be more entitled to decide upon it than we are. This will appear to give ground for what the gentlemen have asserted—that we are afraid to carry the Constitution into effect. This, I apprehend, would not be doing our duty.