It has been said, and addressed with solemnity to our consciences, that we ought not to destroy the Constitution, to change, or modify it; nay, it has been inferred that it is unnecessary and dangerous for us to proceed in this inquiry. It is true, we may decide wrong, and therefore there may be danger; but it is not unnecessary: we have entered too far into the discussion to retreat with honor to ourselves or security to our country: we are sworn as much to exercise constitutional authority, for the general good, as to refrain from assuming powers that are not given to us: we are as responsible for forbearing to act, as we are for acting. Are we to leave this question undetermined, to be contended between the President and Senate? Are we to say that the question to us is indissoluble, and therefore throw it upon the shoulders of the President to determine? If it is complex and difficult, it is certainly disingenuous in us to throw off the decision: besides, after so long a debate has been had, a decision must be made; for it never would do to strike out the words, as that would be deciding, and deciding against the power of the President.
It must be admitted that the Constitution is not explicit on the point in contest; yet the Constitution strongly infers that the power is in the President alone. It is declared that the executive power shall be vested in the President. Under these terms, all the powers properly belonging to the executive department of the government are given, and such only taken away as are expressly excepted. If the Constitution had stopped here, and the duties had not been defined, either the President had had no powers at all, or he would acquire from that general expression all the powers properly belonging to the executive department. In the Constitution, the President is required to see the laws faithfully executed. He cannot do this without he has a control over officers appointed to aid him in the performance of his duty. Take this power out of his hands, and you virtually strip him of his authority; you virtually destroy his responsibility, the great security which this Constitution holds out to the people of America.
Gentlemen will say that, as the Constitution is not explicit, it must be matter of doubt where the power vests. If gentlemen's consciences will not let them agree with us, they ought to permit us to exercise the like liberty on our part. But they tell us we must meet them on the ground of accommodation, and give up a declaration that the power of removal is in the President, and they will acquiesce in declaring him to have the power of suspension; but they should recollect that, in so doing, we sacrifice the principles of the Constitution.
It has been frequently said, that the power of removing is incidental to the power of appointing: as the Constitution implies that all officers, except the judges, are appointed during pleasure, so the power of removal may, in all cases, be exercised. But suppose this general principle true; yet it is an arbitrary principle, I take it, and one that cannot be proved: if it was denied, it could not be established; and if it was established, it is still doubtful whether it would make for the adverse side of this question or not, because it is dubious whether the Senate do actually appoint or not. It is admitted that they may check and regulate the appointment by the President; but they can do nothing more; they are merely an advisory body, and do not secure any degree of responsibility, which is one great object of the present Constitution: they are not answerable for their secret advice; but if they were, the blame, divided among so many, would fall upon none.
