going to construe the Constitution, and many interpret it in a manner which was never intended, I am very cautious how I proceed. I do not like to construe over much. It is a very delicate and critical branch of our duty; and there is not, perhaps, any part of the Constitution on which we should be more cautious and circumspect than on the present.
I am well authorized to say, that the mingling the powers of the President and Senate was strongly opposed in the Convention which had the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States, and the different states, the present system for the government of the Union. Some gentlemen opposed it to the last; and finally it was the principal ground on which they refused to give it their signature and assent. One gentleman called it a monstrous and unnatural connection, and did not hesitate to affirm it would bring on convulsions in the government. This objection was not confined to the walls of the Convention; it has been the subject of newspaper declamation, and perhaps justly so. Ought not we, therefore, to be careful not to extend this unchaste connection any farther?
Gentlemen who undertake to construe, say that they see clearly that the power which appoints must also remove. Now, I have reviewed this subject with all the application and discernment my mind is capable of, and have not been able to see any such thing. There is an agency given to the President, in making appointments, to which the Senate are connected. But how it follows that the connection extends to the removal, positively I cannot see. They say that it follows as a natural, inseparable consequence. This sounds like logic. But if we consult the premises, perhaps the conclusion may not follow. The Constitution opposes this maxim more than it supports it. The President is appointed by electors chosen by the people themselves, or by the state legislatures. Can the state legislatures, either combined or separate, effect his removal? No. But the Senate may, on impeachment by this house. The judges are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; but they are only removable by impeachment; the President has no agency in the removal. Hence, I say, it is not a natural consequence that the power which appoints should have the power of removal also.
We may find it necessary that subordinate officers should be appointed, in the first instance, by the President and Senate. I hope it will not be contended that the President and Senate shall be applied to in all cases when their removal may be necessary. This principle, sir, is not pursued by the Senate themselves, in the very bill that is now before this house, sent down by the Senate, to establish the judicial courts of the United States. It is directed that a marshal shall be appointed for each district, who shall have power to appoint one or more deputies; and these deputies are to be removable from office by the judge of the District Court, or the Circuit Court sitting within the district, at the pleasure of either. It is not said they shall be appointed by the marshal, who may remove them at pleasure; which ought to be the case, if the maxim is true, that the power which appoints necessarily has the power of removal. But I dispute the maxim altogether; for though it is sometimes true, it is often fallacious; but by no means is it that kind of conclusive argument which they contend for.
Gentlemen proceed in their constructions, and they ask, "Why did not the Convention insert a clause in the Constitution, declaring the removal to be in a manner different from the appointment?" They tell us that it must naturally have occurred to them, and that here and there was the
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