Senate would still have some choice, out of which to supply a good one. But, even if he was to do this, what would be the consequence? He would be obliged to do the duties himself; or, if he did not, we would impeach him, and turn him out of office, as he had done others. I must admit, though, that there is a possibility of such an evil, but it is a remote possibility indeed.
I think gentlemen must concede that, if there should be such a passion,—such resentment as I have supposed between the President and the heads of departments,—the one or the other ought to be removed; they must not go on pulling different ways, for the public will receive most manifest injury: therefore it mitigates the appearance of the evil by suffering the public business to go on, which, from their irreconcilable difference, would otherwise be at a stand.
Mr. GERRY. The judges are the expositors of the Constitution and the acts of Congress. Our exposition, therefore, would be subject to their revisal. In this way the constitutional balance would be destroyed. The legislature, with the judicial, might remove the head of the executive branch. But a further reason why we are not the expositors, is, that the judiciary may disagree with us, and undo what all our efforts have labored to accomplish. A law is a nullity, unless it can be carried into execution: in this case, our law will be suspended. Hence all construction of the meaning of the Constitution is dangerous, or unnatural, and therefore ought to be avoided.
This is our doctrine, that no power of this kind ought to be exercised by the legislature. But, we say, if we must give a construction to the Constitution, it is more natural to give the construction in favor of the power of removal vesting in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, because it is in the nature of things that the power which appoints removes also. If there are deviations from this general rule, the instances are few, and not sufficient to warrant our departure on this occasion. We say our construction is superior also, because it does not militate against any clause of the Constitution; whilst their construction militates against several, and, in some respects, renders them mere nullities.
There is a consistency, under a monarchy, of the king's exercising the power of appointment and removal at pleasure. In Great Britain this is the prerogative of the throne; where it is likewise held a maxim, that the king can do no wrong. The chief magistrate under this Constitution is a different character. There is a constitutional tribunal, where he may be arraigned, condemned, and punished, if he does wrong. The reason of this distinction I take to be this: the majesty of the people receives an injury when the President commits an improper act, for which they are to receive satisfaction. Kings have a property in government; and when a monarch acts unwisely he injures his own interest, but is accountable to none, because satisfaction is due to himself alone. He is established in his office for life; it is an estate to him which he is interested to transmit to his posterity unimpaired; the good of the people, upon principles of interest, will be his peculiar study; he ought, therefore, to have power to act in such a manner as is most likely to secure to him this object; then, necessarily, he must have the right of choosing or displacing his agents. There can be no difficulty on this point. But in a confederated republic the chief magistrate has no such trust; he is elected but for four years, after which the government goes into other hands; he is not stimulated to
