the question he deemed determined; but if a more rational plan was adopted, and the sense of the Constitution, upon strict examination, appeared even doubtful, every member must then appeal to his conscience and understanding. If the powers of the house were circumscribed by the letter of the Constitution, much expense might have been saved to the public, as their hands would have been completely tied. But, by the very nature of government, the legislature had an implied power of using every means, not positively prohibited by the Constitution, to execute the ends for which that government was instituted. Every constitutional right should be so liberally construed as to effect the public good. This, it has been said, was taking too great a latitude; but certainly to promote the ends of government was the end of its existence; and by the ties of conscience, each member was bound to exercise every lawful power which could have a tendency to promote the general welfare. It had been said that the doctrine of implication was dangerous, and would alarm the people. He thought it would not, unless the alarm was founded.
Suppose, he said, the power of raising armies was not expressly granted to the general government; would it be inferred from hence, that the power of declaring war, without the means of carrying it on, had been ceded to them? Would it be said that the blood of fellow-citizens was crying for vengeance, though their lives and property called for protection from the hand of government? Would it be said that they had not a constitutional right to be protected? Would it be urged that the Constitution, by not expressly granting to the general government the power of levying armies, had put it out of their power to protect its citizens? This, he conceived, would be a very dangerous doctrine.
Suppose the power of borrowing money had not been expressly given to the federal government; would it not, in emergencies, be inferred from the nature of the general powers granted to it? Suppose the power to lend had not been mentioned, and a surplus of revenue in the public coffers; should it not be distributed among the people, but locked up and suffered to remain unproductive in the treasury? He imagined not. Suppose the question of redeeming the prisoners in captivity at Algiers was before the house; would it be urged that nothing could be done in their favor by the general government, because no power was specially granted? No. Every person, he conceived, that felt as a man, would not think his hands tied when they were to be extended to the relief of suffering fellow-citizens. The power of buying certificates was not particularly mentioned in the Constitution; yet it had been exercised by the general government, and was inferred from that of paying the public debt, and from the reason of the case. The power of establishing banks, he conceived, could be deduced from the same source—from their utility in the ordinary operations of government, and their indispensable necessity in cases of sudden emergencies. It was said that the state banks would serve all these purposes; but why deprive the general government, he asked, of the power of self-defence?
Mr. Ames proceeded to prove that the power of incorporating the subscribers to the bank could be deduced from that clause in the Constitution which had been termed the sweeping clause. Unless a reasonable latitude of construction of this part of the Constitution was allowed, he did not see upon what authority several acts of Congress would rest. Whence did the general government draw the authority they had exercised over the western territory? That authority, he answered, must of necessity belong to Congress: it could not rest with the individual states.
