Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v4.djvu/433

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1791.]
National Bank.Madison.
417

doubt as to its meaning and intention, he thought it his duty to consult his conscience and judgment to solve them; and even if doubts did still remain on two different interpretations of it, he would constantly embrace that the least involved in doubt.

Mr. SEDGWICK expressed his surprise at the objections made to the constitutionality of the bill.

A gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madison) had taken some pains to convince the house that he had uniformly been opposed to seeing the general government exercise the power of establishing banks. He did not wish to dispute with the honorable member the merit of consistency, but only begged leave to remark that the same gentleman had not always been averse to the exercise of power by implication. Witness the proceedings on the propriety of vesting the President of the United States with the authority of removing officers. But in this case, he was willing to take up the question solely on its own merits, without reference to former opinions.

In the present case, he conceived the determination of the question rested, in a great measure, on the meaning of the words necessary and proper.

Mr. MADISON. Those two words had been, by some, taken in a very limited sense, and were thought only to extend to the passing of such laws as were indispensably necessary to the very existence of the government. He was disposed to think that a more liberal construction should be put on them,—indeed, the conduct of the legislature had allowed them a fuller meaning,—for very few acts of the legislature could be proved essentially necessary to the absolute existence of government. He wished the words understood so as to permit the adoption of measures the best calculated to attain the ends of government, and produce the greatest quantum of public utility.

In the Constitution, the great ends of government were particularly enumerated; but all the means were not, nor could they all be, pointed out, without making the Constitution a complete code of laws: some discretionary power, and reasonable latitude, must be left to the judgment of the legislature. The Constitution, he said, had given power to Congress to lay and collect taxes; but the quantum, nature, means of collecting, &c., were of necessity left to the honest and sober discretion of the legislature.

It authorized Congress to borrow money; but of whom, on what terms, and in what manner, it had not ventured to determine; these points of secondary importance were also left to the wisdom of the legislature. The more important powers are specially granted; but the choice from the known and useful means of carrying the power into effect, is left to the decision of the legislature. He enumerated some other powers which are specified in the Constitution as belonging to Congress, and of which the means of execution are not mentioned; and concluded this part of his argument by observing that, if the bank which it was proposed to establish by the bill before the house could be proven necessary and proper to carry into execution any one of the powers given to Congress by the Constitution, this would at once determine the constitutionality of the measure.

He would not, he said, dwell any longer on the constitutionality of the plan under consideration, but would only observe that no power could be exercised by Congress, if the letter of the Constitution was strictly adhered to, and no latitude of construction allowed, and all the good that
vol. iv.53