These are the great objects for which the Constitution was established: and in administering it, we should always keep them in view. And here it is remarkable, that, although common defence and general welfare are held up, in the preamble, amongst the primary objects of attention, they are again mentioned in the 8th section of the 1st article, whereby we are enjoined, in laying taxes, duties, &c., particularly to regard the common defence and general welfare. Indeed, common sense dictates the measure; for the security of our property, families, and liberties—of every thing dear to us—depends on our ability to defend them. The means, therefore, for attaining this object, we ought not to omit a year, a month, or even a day, if we could avoid it; and we are never provided for deforce unless prepared for sudden emergencies.
In the present case, the gentlemen in the opposition generally, as well as the gentleman first up, from Virginia, give the whole clause by which Congress are authorized "to make all laws necessary and proper," &c., no meaning whatever; for they say the former Congress had the same power under the Confederation, without this clause, as the present Congress have with it. The "Federalist" is quoted on this occasion; but, although the author of it discovered great ingenuity, this part of his performance I consider as a political heresy. His doctrine, indeed, was calculated to lull the consciences of those who differed in opinion with him at that time; and, having accomplished his object, he is probably desirous that it may die with the opposition itself The rule in this case says, that where the words bear no signification, we must deviate a little; and as this deviation cannot be made by giving the words less than no meaning, it must be made by a more liberal construction than is given by gentlemen in the opposition. Thus their artillery is turned against themselves; for their own interpretation is an argument against itself.
The last rule mentioned relates to the spirit and reason of the law, and the judge is of opinion "that the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it—of the cause which moved the legislature to enact it." The causes which produced the Constitution were an imperfect union, want of public and private confidence, internal commotions, a defenceless community, neglect of the public welfare, and danger to our liberties. These are known to be the causes, not only by the preamble of the Constitution, but also from our own knowledge of the history of the times which preceded the establishment of it. If these weighty causes produced the Constitution, and it not only gives power for removing them, but also authorizes Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying these powers into effect, shall we listen to assertions, that these words have no meaning, and that the new Constitution has not more energy than the old? Shall we thus unnerve the government, leave the Union as it was under the Confederation,—defenceless against a banditti of Creek Indians,—and thus relinquish the protection of its citizens? Or shall we, by a candid and liberal construction of the powers expressed in the Constitution, promote the great and important objects thereof? Each member must determine for himself. I shall, without hesitation, choose the latter, and leave the people and states to determine whether or not I am pursuing their true interest. If it is inquired where we are to draw the line of a liberal construction, I would also inquire. Where is the line of restriction to be drawn?
The interpretation of the Constitution, like the prerogative of a sove-
