differences should arise betwixt this country and any of the European governments, special envoys might be sent to settle them, as heretofore.
January 22, 1798.
Mr. BAYARD. It had been supposed, by gentlemen, that he might appoint an indefinite number of ministers; and were the house, in that case, he asked, blindly to appropriate for them? This question was predicated upon an abuse of power, whilst the Constitution supposed it would be executed with fidelity. Suppose he were to state the question in an opposite light. Let it be imagined that this country has a misunderstanding with a foreign power, and that the executive should appoint a minister, but the house, in the plenitude of its power, should refuse an appropriation. What might be the consequence? Would not the house have contravened the Constitution by taking from the President the power which by it is placed in him? It certainly would. So that this supposition of the abuse of power would go to the destruction of all authority. The legislature was bound to appropriate for the salary of the chief justice of the United States; and though the President might appoint a chimney-sweeper to the office, they would still be bound. The Constitution had trusted the President, as well as it had trusted that house. Indeed, it was not conceivable that the house could act upon the subject of foreign ministers. Our interests with foreign countries came wholly under the jurisdiction of the executive. The duties of that house related to the internal affairs of the country; but what related to foreign countries and foreign agents was vested in the executive. The President was responsible for the manner in which this business was conducted. He was bound to communicate, from time to time, our situation with foreign powers; and if plans were carried on abroad for dividing or subjugating us, if he were not to make due communication of the design, he would be answerable for the neglect.
Retaliation for Aggressions.
May 23, 1798.
Mr. SITGREAVES said, it is a principle as well settled as any in the law of nations, that, when a nation has received aggressions from another nation, it is competent for the injured nation to pursue its remedy by reprisal before a declaration of war takes place; and these reprisals shall be perfectly warrantable whilst they are commensurate only with the injuries received; and are not, under such circumstances, justifiable cause of war. It is even clear that these reprisals may be made during the pendency of a negotiation, and cannot, according to the law of nations, be justifiable ground for the rupture of any such negotiations.
Alien and Sedition Laws.
June, 1798.
Mr. LIVINGSTON. By this act the President alone is empowered to make the law; to fix in his own mind what acts, what words, what thoughts, or looks, shall constitute the crime contemplated by the bill; that is, the crime of being "suspected to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States." This comes completely within the definition of despotism—a union of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. My opinions on this subject are explicit: they are, that wherever our laws manifestly infringe the Constitution under which they were made the people
