Missouri restriction—an acknowledged abolitionist—to plead the cause of the south at the congress of Panama, Our policy with regard to Hayti is plain. We never can acknowledge her independence. Other states will do as they please; but let us take the high ground, that these questions belong to a class which the peace and safety of a large portion of our Union forbid us even to discuss. Let our government direct all our ministers in South America and Mexico to protest against the independence of Hayti. But let us not go into council on the slave trade and Hayti. These are subjects not to be discussed any where. There is not a nation on the globe with whom I would consult on that subject; and least of all, the new republics.
Judicial System.
Senate, April 7, 1826.
Mr. VAN BUREN. It has been justly observed that "there exists not upon this earth, and there never did exist, a judicial tribunal clothed with powers so various and so important" as the Supreme Court.
By it, treaties and laws made pursuant to the Constitution are declared to be the supreme law of the land. So far, at least, as the acts of Congress depend upon the courts for their execution, the Supreme Court is the judge whether or no such acts are pursuant to the Constitution, and from its judgment there is no appeal. Its veto, therefore, may absolutely suspend nine tenths of the acts of the national legislature. Although this branch of its jurisdiction is not that which has been most exercised, still instances are not wanting in which it has disregarded acts of Congress, in passing upon the rights of others, and in refusing to perform duties required of it by the legislature, on the ground that the legislature had no right to impose them.
Not only are the acts of the national legislature subject to its review, but it stands as the umpire between the conflicting powers of the general and state governments. That wide field of debatable ground between those rival powers is claimed to be subject to the exclusive and absolute dominion of the Supreme Court. The discharge of this solemn duty has not been unfrequent, and certainly not uninteresting. In virtue of this power, we have seen it holding for nought the statutes of powerful states, which had received the deliberate sanction, not only of their legislatures, but of their highest judicatories, composed of men venerable in years, of unsullied purity, and unrivalled talents—statutes, on the faith of which immense estates had been invested, and the inheritance of the widow and the orphan were suspended. You have seen such statutes abrogated by the decision of this court, and those who had confided in the wisdom and power of the state authorities plunged in irremediable ruin—decisions final in their effect, and ruinous in their consequences. I speak of the power of the court, not of the correctness or incorrectness of its decisions. With that we have here nothing to do.
But this is not all. It not only sits in final judgment upon our acts, as the highest legislative body known to the country,—it not only claims to be the absolute arbiter between the federal and state governments,—but it exercises the same great power between the respective states forming this great confederacy, and their own citizens. By the Constitution of the United States, the states are prohibited from passing "any law impairing the obligation of contracts." This brief provision has given to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a tremendous sweep. Before I proceed to
