they should differ in opinion from the court? What, then, would be the effect of such a decision? And what would be the remedy in such a case? Congress would be arrested in the exercise of the disputed power, and the only remedy would be, an appeal to the creating power—three fourths of the states—for an amendment to the Constitution. And by whom must such an appeal be made? It must be made by the party proposing to exercise the disputed power. Now, I will ask whether a sovereign state may not be safely intrusted with the exercise of a power, operating merely as a check, which is admitted to belong to the Supreme Court, and which may be exercised every day by any three of its members. Sir, no idea that can be formed of arbitrary power on the one hand, and abject dependence on the other, can be carried farther than to suppose that three individuals, mere men, "subject to like passions with ourselves," may be safely intrusted with the power to nullify an act of Congress, because they conceive it to be unconstitutional; but that a sovereign and independent state—even the great state of New York—is bound, implicitly, to submit to its operation, even where it violates, in the grossest manner, her own rights, or the liberties of her citizens. But we do not contend that a common case w:ould justify the interposition.
This is the "extreme medicine of the state," and cannot become our daily bread.
Mr. Madison, in his Report, says, "It does not follow, however, that because the states, as sovereign parties to their constitutional compact, must ultimately decide whether it has been violated, that such a decision ought to be interposed, either in a hasty manner, or on doubtful and inferior occasions.
"The resolution has, accordingly, guarded against any misapprehensions of its object, by expressly requiring, for such an interposition, 'the case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous breach of the Constitution, by the exercise of powers not granted by it.'
"But the resolution has done more than guard against misconstruction, by expressly referring to cases of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous nature. It specifies the object of the interposition, which it contemplates to be solely that of arresting the progress of the evil of usurpation, and of maintaining the authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining to the states, as parties to the Constitution."
No one can read this without perceiving that Mr. Madison goes the whole length, in support of the principles for which I have been contending.
The gentleman has called upon us to carry out our scheme practically. Now, sir, if I am correct in my view of this matter, then it follows, of course, that, the right of a state being established, the federal government is bound to acquiesce in a solemn decision of a state, acting in its sovereign capacity, at least so far as to make an appeal to the people for an amendment of the Constitution. This solemn decision of a state (made either through its legislature or a convention, as may be supposed to be the proper organ of its sovereign will—a point I do not propose now to discuss) binds the federal government, under the highest constitutional obligation, not to resort to any means of coercion against the citizens of the dissenting state. How, then, can any collision ensue between the federal and state governments—unless, indeed, the former should determine to enforce the law by unconstitutional means?
Sir, I will put the case home to the gentleman. Is there any violation
