he applies the notion of checks and balances to the interference of different governments. He argues that, if we transgress, each state, as a state, has a right to check us. Does he admit the converse of the proposition—that we have a right to check the states? The gentleman's doctrines would give us a strange jumble of authorities and powers, instead of governments of separate and defined powers. It is the part of wisdom, I think, to avoid this; and to keep the general government and the state governments each in its proper sphere—avoiding, as carefully as possible, every kind of interference.
Finally, sir, the honorable gentleman says that the states will only interfere, by their power, to preserve the Constitution. They will not destroy it, they will not impair it—they will only save, they will only preserve, they will only strengthen it! All regulated governments, all free governments, have been broken up by similar disinterested and well-disposed interference!
Mr. EDWARD LIVINGSTON. I think that the Constitution is the result of a compact entered into by the several states, by which they surrendered a part of their sovereignty to the Union, and vested the part so surrendered in a general government.
That this government is partly popular, acting directly on the citizens of the several states; partly federative, depending for its existence and action on the existence and action of the several states.
That, by the institution of this government, the states have unequivocally surrendered every constitutional right of impeding or resisting the execution of any decree or judgment of the Supreme Court, in any case of law or equity between persons or on matters, of whom or on which that court has jurisdiction, even if such decree or judgment should, in the opinion of the states, be unconstitutional.
That, in cases in which a law of the United States may infringe the constitutional right of a state, but which, in its operation, cannot be brought before the Supreme Court, under the terms of the jurisdiction expressly given to it over particular persons or matters, that court is not created the umpire between a state that may deem itself aggrieved and the general government.
That, among the attributes of sovereignty retained by the states, is that of watching over the operations of the general government, and protecting its citizens against their unconstitutional abuse; and that this can be legally done—
First, in the case of an act, in the opinion of the state palpably unconstitutional, but affirmed in the Supreme Court in the legal exercise of its functions;
By remonstrating against it to Congress;
By an address to the people, in their elective functions, to change or instruct their representatives;
By a similar address to the other states, in which they will have a right to declare that they consider the act as unconstitutional, and therefore void;
By proposing amendments to the Constitution in the manner pointed out by that instrument;
And, finally, if the act be intolerably oppressive, and they find the general government persevere in enforcing it, by a resort to the natural right which every people have to resist extreme oppression.
Secondly, if the act be one of the few which, in its operation, cannot be
