exiles from the Netherlands; and that her silk manufactures—now a flourishing and favorite branch—were not less indebted to emigrants flying from the persecuting edicts of France.—Anderson's History of Commerce.
It appears, indeed, from the general history of manufacturing industry, that the prompt and successful introduction of it into new situations has been the result of emigration from countries in which manufactures had gradually grown up to a prosperous state; as into Italy on the fall of the Greek empire; from Italy into Spain and Flanders, on the loss of liberty in Florence and other cities; and from Flanders and France into England, as above noticed.—Franklin's Canada Pamphlet.
In the selection of cases here made as exceptions to the "let alone" theory, none have been included which were deemed controvertible. And if I have viewed them, or a part of them only, in their true light, they show, what was to be shown, that the power granted to Congress to encourage domestic products, by regulations of foreign trade, was properly granted, inasmuch as the power is, in effect, confined to that body, and may, when exercised with a sound legislative discretion, provide the better for the safety and prosperity of the nation.
With great esteem and regard,
Jos. C. Cabell, Esq. | JAMES MADISON. |
BANKS.
LETTER FROM J. MADISON TO CHAS. J. INGERSOLL,
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE,
ON THE SUBJECT OF "BILLS OF CREDIT;"
Dated Montpelier, February 22, 1831.
Dear Sir: I have received your letter of January 21, asking—
1. Is there any state power to make banks?
2. Is the federal power, as has been exercised, or as proposed to be exercised, by President Jackson, preferable?
The evil which produced the prohibitory clause in the Constitution of the United States, was the practice of the states in making bills of credit, and, in some instances, appraised property, a "legal tender." If the notes of state banks, therefore, whether chartered or unchartered, be made a legal tender, they are prohibited; if not made a legal tender, they do not fall within the prohibitory clause. The number of the Federalist referred to was written with that view of the subject; and this, with probably other contemporary expositions, and the uninterrupted practice of the states in creating and permitting banks, without making their notes a legal tender, would seem to be a bar to the question, if it were not inexpedient now to agitate it.
A virtual and incidental enforcement of the depreciated notes of the state banks, by their crowding out a sound medium, though a great evil, was not foreseen; and, if it had been apprehended, it is questionable whether the Constitution of the United States, (which had many obstacles to encounter,) would have ventured to guard against it, by an additional provision. A virtual, and, it is hoped, an adequate remedy, may hereafter be found in the refusal of state paper, when debased, in any of the federal transactions, and the control of the federal bank; this being itself controlled from suspending its specie payments by the public authority.
On the other question, I readily decide against the project recommended by the President. Reasons, more than sufficient, appear to have been presented to the public in the reviews, and other comments, which it has called forth. How far a hint for it may have been taken from Mr. Jefferson, I know not. The