Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v5.djvu/173

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1787.]
FEDERAL CONVENTION.
147

sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And, indeed, in all cases of public service, the less the profit the greater the honor.

"To bring the matter nearer home: Have we not seen the greatest and most important of our offices, that of general of our armies, executed, for eight years together, without the smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses, in common with the other brave men, his military friends and companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men, in all the United States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed? Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.

"Sir, the saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly, and done my duty."

The motion was seconded by Col. HAMILTON, with the view, he said, merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.87

Mr. DICKINSON moved, "that the executive be made removable by the national legislature, on the request of a majority of the legislatures of individual states." It was necessary, he said, to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the great officers of state. He did not know how provision could be made for the removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the state governments, as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this country, in his opinion, required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the states.

Mr. BEDFORD seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN contended, that the national legislature should have power to remove the executive at pleasure.

Mr. MASON. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the executive the mere creature of the legislature, as a violation of the fundamental principle of good government.

Mr. MADISON and Mr. WILSON observed, that it would leave