in the negative, they would make—affirmatives, 14; negatives, 7, and that all the larger states should be unanimously in the negative, they would make, negatives, 36; in all, affirmatives, 14, negatives 43.
"It is, then, apparent, that the fourteen carry the question against the forty-three, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of assemblies in all countries and ages.
"The greater states, sir, are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentle man has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the states. It appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a different constitution,—some with greater, others with fewer, privileges,—it was of importance to the borderers, when their boundaries were contested, whether, by running the division lines, they were placed on one side or the other. At present, when such differences are done away, it is less material. The interest of a state is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the state is not injured. Small states are more easily well and happily governed than large ones. If, therefore, in such an equal division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to New Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting such a division, and, however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in some states, and their fixed proportion in others, and thence frequently occasion new divisions, I beg leave to propose, for the consideration of the committee, another mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature.
"Let the weakest state say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union;
"Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal proportion;
"The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of Congress;
"The Congress, in this case, to be composed of an equal number of delegates from each state;
"And their decisions to be by the majority of individual members voting.
"If these joint and equal supplies should, on particular occasions, not be sufficient, let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more powerful states for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving to each state the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less, as it should be found proper.
"This mode is not new. It was formerly practised with success by the British government with respect to Ireland and the colonies. We
