On the question for striking out from the fifth resolution the words requiring members of the senatorial branch to be of the age of ——— years at least,—
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, ay, 3; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no, 6; North Carolina, Georgia, divided.
On the question for filling the blank with "thirty years," as the qualification, it was agreed to,—
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no, 4.
Mr. SPAIGHT moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointments to the second branch of the national legislature with the words "seven years."
Mr. SHERMAN thought seven years too long. He grounded his opposition, he said, on the principle that, if they did their duty well they would be reëlected; and if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred five years, which would be between the terms of the first branch and of the executive.
Mr. PIERCE proposed three years. Seven years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs have arisen in England from their septennial act, which was reprobated by most of their patriotic statesmen.
Mr. RANDOLPH was for the term of seven years. The democratic licentiousness of the state legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this second branch is to control the democratic branch of the national legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch, being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland, constituted on like principles, had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure of the executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness and independence may be the more necessary, also, in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution against encroachments of the executive, who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.
Mr. MADISON considered seven years- as a term by no means too long. What we wished was, to give to the government that stability which was every where called for, and which the enemies of the republican form alleged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability, by the term of seven years. His fear was, that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Maryland created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances, perhaps, it may have erred by yielding to the House of Delegates, In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the House of Delegates, they had had with them the
