dience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will be said, that the proposed change in the principles and form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the general government will have real and greater powers, and will be derived, in one branch at least, from the people, not from the governments of the states. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the general legislature, and the states reduced to corporations dependent on the general legislature,—why should it follow that the general government would take from the states any branch of their power, as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desirable to the people? In some of the states, particularly in Connecticut, all the townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction: have the representatives of the people of the townships in the legislature of the state ever endeavored to despoil the townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people, they are attached to it; and their representatives, chosen by and amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a general government to state governments is parallel.
2. Guards were more necessary against encroachments of the state governments on the general government, than of the latter on the former. The great objection made against an abolition of the state governments was, that the general government could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not against the probable abuse of the general power, but against the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable, it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the convenience of the general government itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate governments. Were it practicable for the general government to extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the state governments, the people would not be less free, as members of one great republic, than as members of thirteen small ones. A citizen of Delaware was not more free than a citizen of Virginia; nor would either be more free than a citizen of America. Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the general government to absorb the state governments, no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the state governments towards an independence on the general government, and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them must have suggested to the states the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.
