"The committee to whom was referred the eighth resolution of the report from the Committee of the whole House, and so much of the seventh as has not been decided on, submit the following report:—
"That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted.
"1. That, in the first branch of the legislature, each of the states now in the Union shall be allowed one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the description reported in the seventh resolution of the Committee of the whole House: that each state not containing that number shall be allowed one member: that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first branch.
"2. That, in the second branch, each state shall have an equal vote."[1]
Mr. GORHAM observed, that, as the report consisted of propositions mutually conditional, he wished to hear some explanations touching the grounds on which the conditions were estimated.
Mr. GERRY. The committee were of different opinions, as well as the deputations from which the committee were taken; and agreed to the report merely in order that some ground of accommodation might be proposed. Those opposed to the equality of votes have only assented conditionally; and if the other side do not generally agree, will not be under any obligation to support the report.
Mr. WILSON thought the committee had exceeded their powers.
Mr. MARTIN was for taking the question on the whole report.
Mr. WILSON was for a division of the question; otherwise, it would be a leap in the dark.
Mr. MADISON could not regard the privilege of originating money bills as any concession on the side of the small states. Experience proved that it had no effect. If seven states in the upper branch wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some member, from some of the same states in the lower branch, who would originate it. The restriction as to amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to members in the other House. Bills could be negatived, that they might be sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate should yield to the obstinacy of the first branch, the use of that body, as a check, would be lost. If the first branch should yield to that of the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shown, both in Great Britain, and the states having a similar regulation, that it was a source of frequent and obstinate altercations. These con-
- ↑ This report was founded on a motion in the committee made by Dr. Franklin. It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the states opposed to an equality of votes in the second branch, and was evidently considered by the members on the other side as a gaining of their point. A motion was made by Mr. Sherman, (who acted in the place of Mr. Ellsworth, who was kept away by indisposition,) in the committee, to the following effect, "that each state should have an equal vote in the second branch; provided that no decision therein should prevail unless the majority of states concurring should also comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the United States." This motion was not much deliberated on, or approved, in the committee. A similar proviso had been proposed, in the debates on the Articles of Confederation, in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers to "nine states." See Journals of Congress for 1777, page 462.