which are known to characterize the one, would soon find their way into the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies are always worse than those made by single responsible individuals, or by the people at large.
Col. MASON. It is curious to remark the different language held at different times. At one moment we are told that the legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite power. At another, that it will be governed by intrigue and corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But, not to dwell on this inconsistency, he would observe, that a government which is to last ought at least to be practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed election should be left to the people at large? He conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief magistrate to the people, as it would to refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the candidates.
Mr. WILSON could not see the contrariety stated by (Col. Mason). The legislature might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to affect them and their constituents precisely alike, confidence was due; in others, jealousy was warranted. In the appointment to great offices, where the legislature might feel many motives not common to the public, confidence was surely misplaced. This branch of business, it was notorious, was the most corruptly managed of any that had been committed to legislative bodies.
Mr. WILLIAMSON conceived that there was the same difference between an election, in this case, by the people and by the legislature, as between an appointment by lot and by choice. There are at present distinguished characters, who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not always be the case. The people will be sure to vote for some man in their own state; and the largest state will be sure to succeed. This will not be Virginia, however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As the salary of the executive will be fixed, and he will not be eligible a second time, there will not be such a dependence on the legislature as has been imagined.
On the question on an election by the people, instead of the legislature, it passed in the negative.
Pennsylvania, ay, 1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Mary land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 9.
Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the executive be chosen by electors appointed by the several legislatures of the individual states.
Mr. BROOME seconds.
On the question, it passed in the negative.
Delaware, Maryland, ay, 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina. South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8.
On the question on the words "to be chosen by the national legislature," it passed unanimously in the affirmative.
