row for reconsidering the vote concerning the ineligibility of the executive a second time, it passed in the affirmative.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 8; New Jersey, Georgia, absent.
The residue of the ninth resolution, concerning the executive, was postponed till to-morrow.
The tenth resolution, "That the executive shall have a right to negative legislative acts not afterwards passed by two thirds of each branch," was passed, nem. con.
The eleventh resolution, "That a national judiciary shall be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal," agreed to, nem. con.
On the clause, "the judges of which to be appointed by the second branch of the national legislature,"—
Mr. GORHAM would prefer an appointment by the second branch to an appointment by the whole legislature; but he thought even that branch too numerous, and too little personally responsible, to insure a good choice. He suggested that the judges be appointed by the executive, with the advice and consent of the second branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution of Massachusetts. This mode had been long practised in that country, and was found to answer perfectly well.
Mr. WILSON would still prefer an appointment by the executive; but if that could not be attained, would prefer, in the next place, the mode suggested by Mr. Gorham. He thought it his duty, however, to move, in the first instance, "that the judges be appointed by the executive."
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS seconded the motion.
Mr. L. MARTIN was strenuous for an appointment by the second branch. Being taken from all the states, it would be best informed of characters, and most capable of making a fit choice.
Mr. SHERMAN concurred in the observations of Mr. Martin, adding that the judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to be attended to by the second branch than by the executive.
Mr. MASON. The mode of appointing the judges may depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeachments of the executive. If the judges were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be appointed by the executive. There were insuperable objections, besides, against referring the appointment to the executive. He mentioned, as one, that, as the seat of government must be in some one state, and as the executive would remain in office for a considerable time,—for four, five, or six years at least,—he would insensibly form local and personal attachments, within the particular state, that would deprive equal merit elsewhere of an equal chance of promotion.
Mr. GORHAM. As the executive will be responsible, in point of character at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look through all the states for proper characters. The senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the seat of
