will consequently be more difficult, in these cases, to get the plan through the legislatures than through a convention. 3. In the states, many of the ablest men are excluded from the legislatures, but may be elected into a convention. Among these may be ranked many of the clergy, who are generally friends to good government. Their services were found to be valuable in the formation and establishment of the constitution of Massachusetts. 4. The legislatures will be interrupted with a variety of little business; by artfully pressing which, designing men will find means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate altogether, the national system. 5. If the last article of the Confederation is to be pursued, the unanimous concurrence of the states will be necessary. But will any one say that all the states are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rhode Island should persist in her opposition to general measures? Some other states might also tread in her steps. The present advantage, which New York seems to be so much attached to, of taxing her neighbors by the regulation of her trade, makes it very probable that she will be of the number. It would, therefore, deserve serious consideration, whether provision ought not to be made for giving effect to the system, without waiting for the unanimous concurrence of the states.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. If there be any legislatures who should find themselves incompetent to the ratification, he should be content to let them advise with their constituents, and pursue such a mode as would be competent. He thought more was to be expected from the legislatures, than from the people. The prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States is, to get rid of the public debt; and the idea of strengthening the national government carries with it that of strengthening the public debt. It was said by Col. Mason, in the first place, that the legislatures have no authority in this case; and in the second, that their successors, having equal authority, could rescind their acts. As to the second point he could not admit it to be well founded. An act to which the states, by their legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the first point, he observed that a new set of ideas seemed to have crept in since the Articles of Confederation were established. Conventions of the people, or with power derived expressly from the people, were not then thought of. The legislatures were considered as competent. Their ratification has been acquiesced in without complaint. To whom have Congress applied on subsequent occasions for further powers? To the legislatures, not to the people. The fact is, that we exist at present and we need not inquire how, as a federal society, united by a charter, one article of which is, that alterations therein may be made by the legislative authority of the states. It has been said, that, if the Confederation is to be observed, the states must unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He would answer, that, if such were the urgency and necessity of our situation as to warrant a new compact among a part of the states, founded on the consent of the
