sider the vote fixing seven years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period. On the question for nine years,—
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no, 4; North Carolina, divided.
The term "resident" was struck out, and "inhabitant" inserted nem. con.
Article 5, sect. 3, as amended, was then agreed to, nem. con.198
Article 5, sect. 4, was agreed to, nem. con.
Article 6, sect. 1, was then taken up.
Mr. MADISON and Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to strike out "each House," and to insert "the House of Representatives;" the right of the legislatures to regulate the times and places, &c., in the election of senators, being involved in the right of appointing them; which was disagreed to.
A division of the question being called for, it was taken on the first part down to "but their provisions concerning," &c.
The first part was agreed to, nem. con.
Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to strike out the remaining part, viz., "but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the legislature of the United States." The states, they contended, could and must be relied on in such cases.
Mr. GORHAM. It would be as improper to take this power from the national legislature, as to restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the counties themselves.
Mr. MADISON. The necessity of a general government supposes that the state legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their local convenience or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people, and not to the legislatures of the states, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the legislatures of the states ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places, and manner, of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot, or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place, should be divided into districts, or all meet at one place, should all vote for all the representatives, or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district,—these, and many other points, would depend on the legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the state legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the representation in the legislatures of particular states would produce a like inequality in their representation in the national
vol. v.51
