and prognosticated a failure of the impost scheme, and the moat pernicious effects to the character, the duration, and the interests, of the Confederacy. It was at length, notwithstanding, determined to persist in the attempt for permanent revenue, and a committee was appointed to report the steps proper to be taken.
A motion was made by Mr. RUTLEDGE to strike out the salvage for recaptures on land, on the same principle as he did the words "accruing to the United States." As the latter had been retained by barely seven states, and one of these was not present, the motion of Mr. Rutledge succeeded. Some of those who were on the other side, in consequence, voted against the whole resolution, and it failed. By compromise, it passed as reported by the committee.
The grand committee reported, after another meeting, with respect to the old money, that it should be rated at forty for one. The chair decided, on a question raised, that, according to rule, the blank should not have been filled up by the committee; so the rate was expunged.
From Tuesday, the 24th of December, the Journals suffice until—
A motion was made by Mr. CLARK, seconded by Mr. RUTLEDGE, to revise the instructions relative to negotiations for peace, with a view to exempt the American plenipotentiaries from the obligation to conform to the advice of France. This motion was the effect of impressions left by Mr. Jay's letters, and the intercepted one from Marbois. This evidence of separate views in our ally, and the inconsistency of that instruction with our national dignity, were urged in support of the motion. In opposing the motion, many considerations were suggested, and the original expediency of submitting the commission for peace to the counsels of France descanted upon. The reasons assigned for this expediency were, that at the juncture when that measure took place, the American affairs were in the most deplorable situation, the Southern States being overrun and exhausted by the enemy, and the others more inclined to repose after their own fatigues than to exert their resources for the relief of those which were the seat of the war; that the old paper currency had failed, and with it public credit itself, to such a degree that no new currency could be substituted; and that there was then no prospect of introducing specie for the purpose, our trade being in the most ruinous condition, and the intercourse with the Havana in particular unopened. In the midst of these distresses, the mediation of the two imperial courts was announced. The general idea was, that the two most respectable powers of Europe would not interpose without a serious desire of peace, and without the energy requisite to effect it. The hope of peace was, therefore, mingled with an apprehension that considerable concessions might be exacted from America by the mediators, as a compensation for the essential one which Great Britain was to submit to. Congress, on a trial, found it impossible, from the diversity of opinions and interests, to define any other claims than those of independence and the alliance. A discretionary power, therefore, was to be delegated with regard to all other claims. Mr. Adams was the sole minister for peace; he was personally at variance with the French ministry; his judgment had not the confidence of some, nor his partiality, in case of an interference of claims espoused by different quarters of the United States, the confidence of others. A motion to associate with him two colleagues, to wit, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Jay, had been disagreed to by Congress; the former of these being interested as one of the land companies in territorial claims, which had less chance of being made good in any other way than by a repossession of the vacant country by the British crown; the latter belonging to a state interested in such arrangements as would deprive the United States of the navigation of the Mississippi, and turn the western trade through New York; and neither of them being connected with the Southern States. The idea of having five ministers taken from the whole Union was not suggested until the measure had been adopted, and communicated to the Chevalier de Luzerne to be forwarded to France, when it was too late to revoke it It was supposed also that Mr. Laurens, then in the Tower, would not be out, and that Mr. Jefferson would not go; and that the greater the number of ministers, the greater the danger of discords and indiscretions. It was added that, as it was expected that nothing would be yielded by Great Britain which was not extorted by the address of France in managing the mediators, and us it was the intention of Congress that their minister
