eleven, relating to treaties by two thirds of the Senate, all the states were ay; except Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Georgia, no.258
Mr. GERRY moved that,—
"no officer shall be appointed but to offices created by the Constitution or by law."
This was rejected as unnecessary.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, ay, 5; New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no, 6.
The clause referring to the Senate the trial of impeachments against the President, for treason and bribery, was taken up.
Col. MASON. Why is the provision restrained to treason and bribery only? Treason, as defined in the Constitution, will not reach many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason, as above defined. As bills of attainder, which have saved the British constitution, are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend the power of impeachments. He moved to add, after "bribery," "or maladministration." Mr. GERRY seconded him.
Mr. MADISON. So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. It will not be put in force, and can do no harm. An election of every four years will prevent maladministration.
Col. MASON withdrew "maladministration," and substituted "other high crimes and misdemeanors against the state."
On the question, thus altered,—
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, (in the printed Journal, South Carolina, no,) Georgia, ay, 8; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no, 3.
Mr. MADISON objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the legislature; and for any act which might be called a misdemeanor. The President under these circumstances was made improperly dependent. He would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial of impeachments; or, rather, a tribunal of which that should form a part.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted. The Supreme Court were too few in number, and might be warped or corrupted. He was against a dependence of the executive on the legislature, considering the legislative tyranny the great danger to be apprehended ; but there could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly, on their oaths, that the President was guilty of crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can be turned out.
Mr. PINCKNEY disapproved of making the Senate the court of impeachments, as rendering the President too dependent on the legislature. If he opposes a favorite law, the two Houses will combine against him, and, under the influence of heat and faction, throw him out of office.
Mr. WILLIAMSON thought there was more danger of too much
