delegates by the executive of that state, two of which had relation to the question before Congress. These were—first, a resolution of the General Assembly, declaring its inability to pay more than fifty thousand pounds, Virginia currency, towards complying with the demands of Congress; secondly, the act repealing the act granting the impost of five per cent. These papers were received and read.
Mr. WOLCOTT expressed some astonishment at the inconsistency of these two acts of Virginia; supposed that they had an unfavorable aspect on the business before Congress, and proposed that the latter should be postponed for the present. He was not seconded.
Mr. GORHAM favored the general idea of the motion, animadverting on the refusal of Virginia to contribute the necessary sums, and at the same moment repealing her concurrence in the only scheme that promised to supply a deficiency of contributions. He thought the motion,- however, inaccurately expressed, since the word "general" might be understood to refer to every possible object of taxation, as well as to the operation of a particular tax throughout the states. He observed that the non-payment of the one million two hundred thousand dollars demanded oy Congress, for paying the interest of the debts for the year ———, demonstrated that the constitutional mode of annual requisitions was defective; he intimated that lands were already sufficiently taxed, and that polls and commerce were the most proper objects. At his instance, the latter part of the motion was so amended as to run "establishment of permanent and adequate funds to operate generally throughout the United States."
Mr. HAMILTON went extensively into the subject; the sum of it was as follows: he observed that funds considered as permanent sources of revenue were of two kinds—first, such as would extend generally and uniformly throughout the United States, and would be collected under the authority of Congress; secondly, such as might be established separately within each state, and might consist of any objects which were chosen by the states, and might be collected either under the authority of the states or of Congress. Funds of the first kind, he contended, were preferable; as being, first, more simple, the difficulties attending the mode of fixing the quotas laid down in the Confederation rendering it extremely complicated, and in a manner insuperable; secondly, as being more certain, since the states, according to the said plan, would probably retain the collection of the revenue, and a vicious system of collection prevailed generally throughout the United States—a system by which the collectors were chosen by the people, and made their offices more subservient to their popularity than to the public revenue; thirdly, as being more economical, since the collection would be effected with fewer officers, under the management of Congress, than under that of the states.
Mr. GORHAM observed, that Mr. Hamilton was mistaken in the representation he had given of the collection of taxes in several of the states, particularly in that of Massachusetts, where the collection was on a footing which rendered it sufficiently certain.
Mr. WILSON, having risen to explain something which had fallen from him, threw out the suggestion that several branches of the revenue, if yielded by all the states, would perhaps be more just and satisfactory than any single one; for example, an impost on trade combined with a land tax.
Mr. DVER expressed a strong dislike to a collection by officers appointed under Congress, and supposed the states would never be brought to consent to it.
Mr. RAMSAY was decidedly in favor of the proposition. Justice, he said, entitled those who had lent their money and services to the United States to look to them for payment; that if general and certain revenues were not provided, the consequence would be that the army and public creditors would have soon to look to their respective states only for satisfaction; that the burden in this case would fall unequally on the states; that rivalships relative to trade would impede a regular impost, and would produce confusion among the states; that some of the states would never make, of themselves, provision for half-pay, and that the army would be so far defrauded of the rewards stipulated to them by Congress; that although it might be uncertain whether the states would accede to plans founded on the proposition before the house, yet, as Congress was convinced of its truth and importance, it was their duty to make the experiment.
vol. v.5
