national edifices and monuments, from their share in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of the government, it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to give them, when become the majority, a power of legislation over the landed property without the consent of the proprietors. Some shield against the invasion of their rights would not be out of place in a just and provident system of government. The principle of such an arrangement has prevailed in all governments where peculiar privileges or interests, held by a part, were to be secured against violation, and in the various associations where pecuniary or other property forms the slake. In the former case, a defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be wrong, it is not in the defence, but in the kind of privilege to be defended, in the latter case, the shares of suffrage allotted to individuals have been, with acknowledged justice, apportioned more or less to their respective interests in the common stock.
These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of government as would give security to the part of the society having most at stake, and being most exposed to danger. These modifications present themselves.
1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, and to such as hold an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The objection to this regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle of free government, that those who are to be bound by laws ought to have a voice in making them. And the violation would be more strikingly unjust as the law-makers become the minority. The regulation would be as unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage the numerical and physical force in a constant struggle against the public authority, unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.
2. Confining the right of suffrage for one branch to the holders of property, and for the other branch to those without property. This arrangement, which would give a mutual defence where there might be mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality and fairness. But it would not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The temptation, also, to encroach, though in a certain degree mutual, would be felt more strongly on one side than on the other. It would be more likely to beget an abuse of the legislative negative, in extorting concessions at the expense of property, than the reverse. The division of the state into two classes, with distinct and independent organs of power, and without any intermingled agency whatever, might lead to contests and antipathies not dissimilar to those between the patricians and plebeians at Rome.
3. Confining the right of electing one branch of the legislature to freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders of property in electing the other branch. This would give a defensive power to the holders of properly, and to the class also without property, when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in the meantime of a participation in the public councils. If the holders of property would thus have a twofold share of representation, they would have at the same time a twofold stake in it—the rights of property as well as of persons, the twofold object of political institutions. And if no exact and sate equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable that a preponderating weight should be allowed to the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide how far the practice in this case would accord with the theory. Such a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in New York, and has been abandoned,—whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in North Carolina,—with what practical indications, is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory, ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period; until, in fact, the non-freeholders should be the majority.
4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal and universal suffrage for each branch of the government, such as prevails generally in the United States, a resource favorable to the right of the lauded and other property, when its possessors become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the election districts for one branch of the legislature, and a prolongation of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a contracted theatre. And, although an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be to render the body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason and justice could regain their ascendency.
5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage, and very short periods of election, within contracted spheres, be required for each branch of the government, the security for the holders of property, when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, and