actual fighting strength of the Sikhs at thirty-four thousand, and says they were encamped as follows:
Their centre was formed back of the town of Kalrá; their left on a small stream called Kátelah, which runs into the Chenab; and the Dwárah, another small stream of some width but nearly dry, protected their right. Not far from the Khoree Pass, in the rear, was the city of Gujerat. On a thorough examination of the position by Lord Gough and his staff, it was seen that it lacked strength. Nowhere did the right wing of the Sikh army offer serious resistance to men or artillery. The left wing on the Kátelah was even weaker than the rest of the position as it rested en l'air; in fact, on no side was there any serious protection against assault. It was decided, therefore, to strike at the left and centre of the Sikh position, and to force them back on their right.
To act upon this plan an advance of the heavy artillery, formed in his centre, was ordered by Lord Gough; the right wing, made up of the divisions of Gilbert and Whish, supported by the larger part of the field artillery, was also to move forward. After these should have doubled in the left and centre of the Sikh army, upon its right Campbell's and Dundas' divisions, forming the British left wing, were to come up and end the work. Then the cavalry reserve were to come in to make the disaster to the Sikhs irretrievable. The British line was to advance to the enemy's position by following the bank of the Dwárah. The British artillery, being much superior to the Sikh forces, both in the number of guns and their calibre, Lord Gough intended to delay the advance of his infantry to close quarters until the guns had been freely used. The British officers felt that a Pyrrhæan victory, as the hard-fought battle of Chillianwallah had proved only five weeks before, could not be afforded. The Sikhs as well as the British wished for a decisive battle and were entirely confident of victory.
