Page:Delaware v. Pennsylvania (2023).pdf/3

Syllabus

a matter of equity among the several States.” §§2501(3), 2503. Because MoneyGram does not keep records of creditor addresses as a matter of business practice, application of the common law to the Disputed Instruments would produce the same inequitable result that the FDA is designed to remedy. Pp. 9–14.

(2) Delaware’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. First, the State contends that “money order” refers to a specific commercial product labeled as such on the instrument and sold to low-income individuals in small amounts. Unable to present a dictionary definition that cabins the term as described, Delaware attempts to highlight the various ways in which the Disputed Instruments differ from money orders. But Delaware never explains how the differences are relevant to the assessment of similarity for FDA purposes or how such differences undermine the similarities previously outlined above.

In an effort to make those proffered differences more relevant, Delaware asserts that the FDA was actually concerned with dissuading States from adopting costly recordkeeping requirements that would then be passed on to consumers. Delaware argues that the Disputed Instruments are unlike money orders in that the consumers of the Disputed Instruments are typically more capable of absorbing the cost of recordkeeping requirements. The text of the FDA, however, does not support this argument.

Finally, Delaware’s suggestion that §2503 be read narrowly to avoid creating surplusage and sweeping in all sorts of unintended financial products goes too far. While there is some merit to Delaware’s concern about a broad definition of “money order,” this Court need not actually define that term, as it suffices under the FDA that the instruments in question be “similar” to a money order. Pp. 14–16.

(b) Both Delaware and, to some extent, the Special Master, claim that even if the Disputed Instruments qualify as “other similar written instrument[s]” under the FDA, they are also “third party bank check[s],” which are expressly excluded from the FDA. The problem with this argument is that the FDA does not define that phrase. Nor does that phrase have a commonly accepted meaning. Delaware insists that the term means a check signed by a bank officer and paid through a third party. But the State provides no theory as to why it matters to the FDA’s escheatment rules whether a financial instrument is or is not paid through a third party. In his Second Interim Report, the Special Master offered the view that “third party bank check” was intended to exclude from the FDA’s reach certain well-known financial instruments upon which a bank may be liable, specifically, cashier’s checks, certified checks, and teller’s checks and thus, to the extent a bank shares liability with MoneyGram on a Disputed Instrument, that product should likewise be characterized as a third