Page:Democracy in America (Reeve).djvu/448

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er of acting in the name of the whole nation, in those cases in which the nation has to appear as a single and undivided power; as, for instance, in foreign relations, and in offering a common resistance to a common enemy; in short, in conducting those affairs which I have styled exclusively national.

In this division of the rights of sovereignity, the share of the Union seems at first sight to be more considerable than that of the states; but a more attentive investigation shows it to be less so. The undertakings of the government of the Union are more vast, but their influence is more rarely felt. Those of the provincial government are comparatively small, but they are incessant, and they serve to keep alive the authority which they represent. The government of the Union watches the general interests of the country; but the general interests of a people have a very unquestionable influence upon individual happiness; while provincial interests produce a most immediate effect upon the welfare of the inhabitants. The Union secures the independence and the greatness of the nation, which do not immediately affect private citizens; but the several states maintain the liberty, regulate the rights, protect the fortune, and secure the life and the whole future prosperity of every citizen.

The federal government is very far removed from its subjects, while the provincial governments are within the reach of them all, and are ready to attend to the smallest appeal. The central government has upon its side the passions of a few superior men who aspire to conduct it; but upon the side of the provincial governments are the interests of all those second-rate individuals who can only hope to obtain power within their own state, and who nevertheless exercise the largest share of authority over the people because they are placed nearest to its level.

The Americans have therefore much more to hope and to fear from the states than from the Union; and, in conformity with the natural tendency of the human mind, they are more likely to attach themselves to the former than to the latter. In this respect their habits and feeling harmonize with their interests.

When a compact nation divides its sovereignty, and adopts a confederate form of government, the traditions, the customs, and the manners of the people are for a longtime at variance with their legislation; and the former tend to give a degree of influence to the central government which the latter forbids. When a number