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CHAPTER IV.
OF CERTAIN PECULIAR AND ACCIDENTAL CAUSES WHICH EITHER LEAD
PEOPLE TO COMPLETE CENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH DIVERT THEM FROM IT.
If all democratic nations are instinctively led to the centralization
of government, they tend to this result in an unequal manner.
This depends on the particular circumstances which may promote
or prevent the natural consequences of that state of society—circumstances
which are exceedingly numerous; but I shall only
advert to a few of them.
Among men who have lived free long before they became equal, the tendencies derived from free institutions combat, to a certain extent, the propensities superinduced by the principle of equality; and although the central power may increase its privileges among such a people, the private members of such a community will never entirely forfeit their independence. But when the equality of conditions grows up among a people which has never known, or has long ceased to know, what freedom is (and such is the case upon the continent of Europe,) as the former habits of the nation are suddenly combined, by some sort of natural attraction, with the novel habits and principles engendered by the state of society, all powers seem spontaneously to rush to the centre. These powers accumulate there with astonishing rapidity, and the state instantly attains the utmost limits of its strength, while private persons allow themselves to sink as suddenly to the lowest degree of weakness.
The English who emigrated three hundred years ago to found a democratic commonwealth on the shores of the New World, had all learned to take a part in public affairs in their mother country; they were conversant with trial by jury; they were accustomed to liberty of speech and of the press—to personal freedom, to the
