least substantial justice. The Athenian juror, it is true, had not received what we call a legal education; but he was naturally critical and sharp-witted, and he was well practised in the hearing of causes. It is quite possible that the average decisions of an Athenian jury may have been as good and satisfactory as those of an English. There was, of course, a danger of their being swayed too much at times by political considerations. But to this we know that an English jury is also liable. There was another and a worse danger. The population of Athens was comparatively small; and so it would often happen that plaintiff and defendant, and the case at issue between them, would be well known to the jurors. The Athenian pleader was continually appealing to the personal knowledge of the jury, and would in this manner supplement deficiencies in the evidence. "He is a scoundrel; you all know him to be one,"—this was the sort of language commonly addressed to a jury at Athens. Æschines, in prosecuting one Timarchus, dwells on the notoriety of the man's guilt and wickedness—"Such," he says, "is the testimony of the whole people of Athens, and it is not right that they should be convicted of perjury." This strikes us as a very loose method of procedure. Yet we find it repeatedly in the speeches of Demosthenes. And it is what we must expect where the judicial system is made thoroughly democratic. We must not be surprised at the savage invective with which the greatest Athenian orators thought it seemly to interlard their speeches. Even with us and all our restrictions, advocates contrive occasionally to indulge in considerable licence, and did
