and ingenious, and must have been convincing to those who would not let themselves be carried away by an unreasoning antipathy to everything Theban.
"The Lacedæmonians," he says, "are acting a crafty part. They say they cannot retain the gratitude they feel for you for helping them in a time of urgent need unless you now allow them to commit an injustice. However repugnant it may be to the designs of the Spartans that we should adopt the Arcadian alliance "(that is, the alliance of Megalopolis), "surely their gratitude for having been saved by us in a crisis of extreme peril ought to outweigh their resentment for being checked in their aggression now."
As to the bait held out by Sparta to Athens in the prospect of the recovery of Oropus, he says:—
"My opinion is, first, that our State, even without sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedæmonians, may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are minded to act justly, and that of others who hold Theban usurpation to be intolerable. Secondly, supposing that it were evident to us that, unless we permit the Lacedæmonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we cannot obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I deem it more expedient to let Oropus alone than to abandon Messenia and the Peloponnese to the Lacedæmonians. I imagine the question between us and them would soon be about other matters. . . .
"I am sure, to judge from rational observation—and I think most Athenians will agree with me—that
