plicity of every people which knew him not. When one has grown strong, as he has, by rapacity and artifice, on the first pretext, the slightest reason, all is overturned and broken up. If you will perform your duties properly, not only will it appear that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but the poor state of his native empire and power will be revealed. To speak roundly, the Macedonian power is very well as a help, as it was for you in the time of Timotheus against the Olynthians. For them, too, against Potidæa, it was an important alliance. Lately, as you know, it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the regnant house; and indeed the accession of any power, however small, is undoubtedly useful. But of itself Macedon is feeble, and has numberless deficiencies. The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's greatness—his wars and his expeditions—have made it more insecure than it was originally. Do not imagine that Philip and his subjects have the same likings. He craves glory—makes that his passion; is ready for any consequence of adventure and peril—preferring, as he does, to a life of safety, the honour of achieving what no Macedonian king ever did before. They have no share in the glorious result: ever harassed by these excursions, they suffer and toil without ceasing; they have no leisure for their employments or private affairs, and cannot so much as dispose of their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed on account of the war. We may easily infer from all this what is the general Macedonian feeling towards Philip. His mercenaries and guards, in-