Opinion of the Court
would on this view be superfluous, and we “generally presum[e] that statutes do not contain surplusage.” Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 299, n. 1 (2006). By contrast, giving effect to every word of the limited-purpose definition narrows the primary definition, so that the debt-collector-related prohibitions of the FDCPA (with the exception of §1692f(6)) do not apply to those who, like McCarthy, are engaged in no more than security-interest enforcement.
Second, we think Congress may well have chosen to treat security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary debt collection in order to avoid conflicts with state nonjudicial foreclosure schemes. As Colorado’s law makes clear, supra, at 3–4, state nonjudicial foreclosure laws provide various protections designed to prevent sharp collection practices and to protect homeowners, see 2 Dunaway §17:1. And some features of these laws are in tension with aspects of the Act. For example, the FDCPA broadly limits debt collectors from communicating with third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.” §1692c(b). If this rule were applied to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, then advertising a foreclosure sale–an essential element of such schemes–might run afoul of the FDCPA. Given that a core purpose of publicizing a sale is to attract bidders, ensure that the sale price is fair, and thereby protect the borrower from further liability, the result would hardly benefit debtors. See 2 Dunaway §17:4. To be sure, it may be possible to resolve these conflicts without great harm to either the Act or state foreclosure schemes. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U. S. 291, 296–297 (1995) (observing that the FDCPA’s protections may contain certain “implici[t] exception[s]”). But it is also possible, in light of the language it employed, that Congress wanted to avoid the risk of such conflicts altogether.
Third, for those of us who use legislative history to help
