Opinion of the Court
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–1307
DENNIS OBDUSKEY, PETITIONER v. MCCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[March 20, 2019]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates “ ‘debt collector[s].’ ” 15 U. S. C. §1692a(6); see 91 Stat. 874, 15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq. A “ ‘debt collector,’ ” the Act says, is “any person… in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” §1692a(6). This definition, however, goes on to say that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” (a separate provision of the Act), “[the] term [debt collector] also includes any person… in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” Ibid.
The question before us concerns this last sentence. Does it mean that one principally involved in “the enforcement of security interests” is not a debt collector (except “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)”)? If so, numerous other provisions of the Act do not apply. Or does it simply reinforce the fact that those principally involved in the enforcement of security interests are subject to §1692f(6) in addition to the Act’s other provisions?
In our view, the last sentence does (with its §1692f(6)
