Opinion of the Court
ing on the debt nor provided verification. App. 22–23. Instead, the firm initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure action by filing a notice of election and demand with the county public trustee. Ibid.; see id., at 39–41. The notice stated the amount due and advised that the public trustee would “sell [the] property for the purpose of paying the indebtedness.” Id., at 40.
Obduskey then filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the firm had violated the FDCPA by, among other things, failing to comply with the verification procedure. Id., at 29. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the law firm was not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the Act, so the relevant Act requirements did not apply. Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 2016 WL 4091174, *3 (D Colo., July 19, 2016).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the “mere act of enforcing a security interest through a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding does not fall under” the Act. Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F. 3d 1216, 1223 (2018).
Obduskey then petitioned for certiorari. In light of different views among the Circuits about application of the FDCPA to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, we granted the petition. Compare ibid. and Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F. 3d 568, 573 (CA9 2016) (holding that an entity whose only role is the enforcement of security interests is not a debt collector under the Act), with Kaymark v. Bank of America, N. A., 783 F. 3d 168, 179 (CA3 2015) (holding that such an entity is a debt collector for the purpose of all the Act’s requirements), Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F. 3d 453, 461 (CA6 2013) (same), and Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, P. L. L. C., 443 F. 3d 373, 376 (CA4 2006) (same).
