at once destroy all the preceding arguments; g. From the gradual upward progression in the works of creation, from plants to animals and from the lower animals to man, which leads us to infer that the series ascends from mall to beings absolutely perfect. In treating of the nature of the gods, the pantheistic principle is again broadly asserted,—God is the Universe and the Universe is God,— whence is derived the conclusion that the Deity must be spherical in form, because the sphere is the most perfect of figures. But while the Universe is God as a whole, it contains within its parts many gods, among the number of whom are the heavenly bodies. Then follows a curious digression on the origin of the Greek and Roman Pantheon, and on the causes which led men to commit the folly of picturing to themselves gods differing in shape, in age, and in apparel; of assigning to them the relationships of domestic life, and of ascribing to them the desires and passions by which mortals are agitated. Lastly, the government and providence of the gods is deduced from three considerations: (α) From their existence, which being granted, it necessarily follows, that they must rule the world. (β) From the admitted truth, that all things are subject to the laws of Nature; but Nature, when properly defined and understood, is another name for God. (γ) From the beauty, harmony, wisdom, and benevolence, manifested in the works of creation. This last section is handled with great skill and effect; the absurdity of the doctrine which taught that the world was produced by a fortuitous concourse of atoms is forcibly exposed, while the arguments derived from astronomy, from the structure of plants, of fishes, of terrestial animals, and of the human frame, form a most interesting essay on natural theology. The whole is wound up by demonstrating that all things serviceable to man were made for his use, and that the Deity watches over the safety and welfare, not only of the whole human race collectively, but of every individual member of the family.
In the third book Cotta resumes the discourse for the purpose not of absolutely demolishing what has been advanced by Balbus, but of setting forth, after the fashion of the Sceptics, that the reasonings employed by the last speaker were unsatisfactory and not calculated to produce conviction. In following his course over the different divisions in order, we find two remarkable blanks in the text. By the first we lose the criticism upon the evidence for the visible appearances of the gods on earth; the second leaves us in ignorance of the doubts cast upon the belief of a general ruling Providence. We have no means of discovering how these deficiencies arose; but it has been conjectured, that the chapters were omitted by some early Christian transcriber, who conceived that they might be quoted for a special purpose by the enemies of revealed religion.
The authorities followed in these books, in so far as they can be ascertained, appear to have been, for the Epicurean doctrines, the numerous works of Epicurus himself, whose very words are sometimes quoted, and the lectures of his distinguished follower Zeno, which Cicero had attended while residing at Athens; in the development of the Stoic principles much was derived from Cleanthes, from Chrysippus, from Antipater of Tarsus, and from Posidonius περὶ θεῶν, while in the dexterous and subtle logic of Cotta we may unquestionably trace the master-spirit of Carneades as represented in the writings of his disciple Cleitomachus. (Kühner, p. 98.)
The Editio Princeps is included in the collection of the philosophical works of Cicero printed by Sweynheym and Pannartz, in 2 vols. fol., Rome, 1471. [See above, p. 719, b.] The edition of Davis, Camb. 8vo., 1718, long held the first place, and has been often reprinted; but that of Moser and Creuzer, 8vo., Leipz. 1818, must now be regarded as the best. The pretended 4th book published by Seraphinus at Bologna, 8vo., 1811, is an absurd forgery, if indeed the author ever intended or hoped to deceive, which seems doubtful.
2. De Divinatione Libri II.
This is intended as a continuation of the preceding work, out of which the inquiry naturally springs. We are here presented with an exposition of the conflicting opinions of the Porch and the Academy upon the reality of the science of divination, and the degree of confidence which ought to be reposed in its professors. In the first book the doctrines of the Stoics are defended by Q. Cicero, who begins by dividing divination into two branches. 1. The divination of Nature. 2. The divination of Art. To the first belong dreams, inward presages, and presentiments, and the ecstatic phrenzy, during which the mind inspired by a god discerns the secrets of the future, and pours forth its conceptions in prophetic words; in the second are comprehended the indications yielded by the entrails of the slaughtered victim, by the flight, the cries, and the feeding of birds, by thunder and lightning, by lots, by astrology, and by all those strange sights and sounds which were regarded as the shadows cast before by coming events. A cloud of examples is brought to establish the certainty of each of the various methods, cases of failure being explained away by supposing an error in the interpretation of the sign, while the truth of the general principles is confirmed by an appeal to the concurring belief of philosophers, poets, and mankind at large. Silence Quintus maintains, that we are justified in concluding that the future is revealed to us both from within and from without, and that the information proceeds from the Gods, from Fate, or from Nature; having, however, previously insisted that he was not bound to explain how each circumstance came to pass, it being sufficient for his purpose if he could prove that it actually did come to pass.
In the second book Cicero himself brings forward the arguments of Carneades, who held that. divination was altogether a delusion, and that the knowledge which it pretends to convey, if real, would be a curse rather than a blessing to men. lie then proceeds to confute each of the propositions enunciated by his antagonist, and winds up by urging the necessity of upholding and extending the influence of true religion, and of waging a vigorous war in every quarter against superstition under every form.
Although many modern writers may be and probably are quite correct in their assertion, that the whole religious system of the Romans was a mere engine of government, that it was a deliberate cheat, in which men of education were the deceivers and the ignorant populace the dupes, yet we have no right in the present instance, and the
