XENOCRATES. the divine principium as alone indivisible, and remaining like itself {TavrSv) ; the material, as the divisible, partaking of multiformity, and different (i^arepot/), and that from the union of the two, or from the limitation of the unlimited by the absolute unity, he deduced number, and for that reason called the soul of the universe, like that ot indi- vidual beings, a self moving number, which, by virtue of its twofold root in the same and the different, shares equally in permanence and motion, and attains to consciousness by means of the recon- ciliation of this opposition. It is also probable that, like Speusippus, he gave up the distinction between primal numbers and ideas, and did not even sepa- rate mathematical number from primal number. Then, going back to the Pythagoreans, he appears to have made use of his elementary numbers in the first instance as exponents of relations with refer- ence to the different grades as well of the divine activity as of material existence. In the derivation of things according to the series of the numbers he seems to have gone further than any of his prede- cessors (Theophrast. Met. c. 3). He approximated to the Pythagoreans again in this, that (as is clear from his explanation of the soul) he regarded num- ber as the conditioning principle of consciousness, and consequently of knowledge also ; he thought it necessary, however, to supply what was wanting in the Pythagorean assumption by the more accu- rate definition, borrowed from Plato, that it is only in so far as number reconciles the opposition be- tween the same and the different, and has raised itself to self-motion, that it is soul. We find a similar attempt at the supplementation of the Pla- tonic doctrine in Xenocrates's assumption of indivi- sible lines (Aristot. de Lin. insec. Phys. Ausc. vi. 2; comp. Simpl. z« Arid. Phys. f. 30). In them he thought he had discovered what, according to Plato {Tim. p. 53, c), God alone knows, and he among men who is loved by him, namely, the elements or principia of the Platonic triangles. He seems to have described them as first, original lines, and in a similar sense to have spoken of original plain figures and bodies (Simpl. in Arist. de Caelo; Schol. in Arist. p. 510. 35), convinced that the principia of the existent should be sought not in the material, not in the divisible which attains to the condition of a phenomenon, but merely in the ideal definitude of form. He may very well, in accordance with this, have regarded the point as a merely subject- ively admissible presupposition, and a passage of Aristotle respecting this assumption {de Anim,a, i. 4, extr.) should perhaps be referred to him. Our information with regard to the Ethic of Xenocrates is still more scanty than that respecting his Dialectic and Phj^sic. "We only see that here, also, he endeavoured to supplement the Platonic doctrine in individual points, and at the same time to give it a more direct applicability to life. He distinguished from the good and the bad a something which is neither good nor bad (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. xi. 4). In his view, as in that of the older Academy generally, the good is that which should be striven after for itself, that is, which has value in itself, while the had is the opposite of this (Cic. de Leg. i. 13). Conse- quently, that which is neither good nor bad is what in itself is neither to be striven after nor to be avoided, but derives value or the contrary ac- cording as it serves as means for what is good or bad, or rather, is used by us for that purpose. XENOCRATES. 1293 While, however, Xenocrates (and with him Sneu- sippus and the other philosophers of the older Academy appear to have coincided, Cic. de Fin. iv. 18, &c.) would not allow that these intermediate things, such as health, beauty, fame, the gifts of fortune, &c. were valuable in themselves, he did not allow that they were absolutely worthless or indif- ferent {Cxc.de Leg. i. 21). According, therefore, as what belongs to the intermediate region is adapted to bring about or to hinder the good, Xenocrates ap- pears to have designated it as good or evil, pro- bably with the proviso, that by misuse what is good might become evil, and vice versa, that by virtue, what is evil might become good. (Cic. Tusc . V. 10, 18.) Still he appears to have maintained in the most decided manner that virtue alone is valuable in itself, and that the value of every thing else is conditional (Cic. II. cc, comp. Acad. i. 6). Accord- ing to this, happiness should coincide with the consciousness of virtue (Arist. Top. ii. 6, vii. 1, ib. Alex.), though its reference to the relations of human life requires the additional condition, that it is only in the enjoyment of the good things and circumstances originally designed for it by nature that it attains to completion : to these good things, however, sensuous gratification does not belong (Cic. Tusc. v. 13, comp. 17, de Fin. ii. 11 ; Senec. Epist. 85). In this sense he on the one hand de- noted (perfect) happiness as the possession of per- sonal virtue, and the capabilities adapted to it, and therefore reckoned among its constituent elements, besides moral actions conditions and facilities (7rpa|ei9, e|eiy, Kal diaOeaeis)., those movements and relations {crxea-eis) also without which ex- ternal good things cannot be attained (Ciem. Alex. Strom, ii. p. 419 ; comp. Cic. de Fin. iv. 7, v. 9, Acad. ii. 44, 45, Tusc. iv. 10, 26, 31), and on the other hand did not allow that wisdom, under- stood as the science of first causes or intelligible essence, or as theoretical understanding, is by itself the true wisdom which should be striven after by men (Clem. Alex. Strom, ii. p. 369 ; Cic. Acad. ii. 44, 45), and therefore seems to have re- garded this human wisdom as at the same time exerted in investigating, defining, and applying {Stewp7]riK^ Kol dpia-TiKT], Arist. Top. vi. 3). How decidedly he insisted not only on the recognition of the unconditional nature of moral excellence, but on morality of thought, is shown by his declaration, that it comes to the same thing whether one casts longing eyes, or sets one's feet upon the property of others (Aelian, V. H. xiv. 42). Plis moral earnestness is also expressed in the warning that the ears of children should be guarded against the poison of immoral speeches. (Plut. de Audit, p. 38, a.) Comp. Van de Wynpersee, Diatribe de Xeno- crate Chaleedonio, Lugd. Batav. 1822, with the review in the llcidelberger Jahrhuvher^ 1824, p. 275, &c., by the writer of this article. [Ch. A. B. j XENO'CRATES. minor literary persons. 1. At the conclusion of his life of the celebrated phi- losopher of Chalcedon, Diogenes Laertius (iv. 15) mentions five other persons of the name. The first of them was a very ancient writer on Tactics {toktikos). Menagius {ad loc.) identifies him with the Xenocrates mentioned by Strabo (xii. p. 550) as the instructor of Hecataeus of Miletus, and Menecrates of Elaea. (See also Ukert, Unter- sudiungen illier die Geographie des Hecataeus und Damastes, Vimar. 1814, 8vo. pp. 5, foil. n. 4.)
