PHILIPPUS. One great advantage of this acquisition was, that it put him in possession of the gold mines of the district, the mode of working which he so im- proved as to derive from them, so Diodorus tells us, a revenue of 1000 talents, or 24;^,750/. — a sum, however, which doubtless falls far short of what they yielded annually on the whole. (Diod. xvi. 8 ; comp. Strab. vii. p. 323 ; Dem. Olynth. i. p. 11, Fhilipp. i. p. 50.) From this point there is for some time a pause in the active operations of Philip. He employed it, no doubt, in carefully watching events, the course of which, as for instance the Social war (a c. 357 — 355), was of itself tending towards the accomplishment of his ambitious designs. And so well had he disguised these, that although exas- peration against him had been excited at Athens, no suspicion of them, no apprehension of real danger appears to have been felt there ; and even Demosthenes, in his speech against war with Per- sia (Trept (Tvixixopiwv), delivered in B. c. 354, as also in that for the Megalopolitans (b. c. 353), makes no mention at all of the Macedonian power or projects (comp. Dem. Philipp. iii. p. 1 1 7 ; Clint. F. H. vol. ii. sub annis 353, 341.) In b. c. 354, the application made to Philip by Callias, the Chalcidian, for aid against Plutarchus, tyrant cf Eretria, gave him an opportunity, which he did not neglect, of interposing in the affairs of Euboea, and quietly laying the foundation of a strong Macedonian party in the island. [Callias, No. 4.J But there was another and a nearer object to which the views of Philip were directed, — viz. ascendancy in Thrace, and especially the mastery of the Chersonesus, which had been ceded to the Athenians by Cersobleptes, and the possession of which would be of the utmost importance to the Macedonian king in his struggle with Athens, even if we doubt whether he had yet looked be- yond to a wider field of conquest in Asia. It was then perhaps in B. c. 353, that he marched as far westward as Maroneia, where Cersobleptes opened a negotiation with him for a joint invasion of the Chersonesus, — a design which was stopped only by the refusal of Amadocus to allow Philip a passage through his territory. No attempt was made to force one ; and, if we are right in the conjectural date assigned to the event, Philip would naturally be unwilling to waste time in such a contest, when the circumstances of the Sacred War promised to afford him an opportunity of gaining a sure and permanent footing in the very heart of Greece. (Dem. c. Arist. p. 681.) The capture of Methone, however, was a neces- sary preliminary to any movement towards the south, lying as it did between him and the Thes- salian border, and serving as a shelter to his enemies, and as a station from which they could annoy him. He did not take it till after a length- ened siege, in the course of which he himself lost an eye. The inhabitants were permitted to depart with one garment, but the town was utterly de- stroyed and the land apportioned to Macedonian colonists. (Diod. xvi. 31, 34; Dem. 0/^w^A. i. p. 1 2, Philipp. i. p. 41, iii. p. 117 ; Pint. Par. 8 ; Luc. de Scrih. Hist, 38.) He was now able to take ad- vantage of the invitation of the Aleuadae to aid them against Lycophron, the tyrant of Pherae, and advanced into Thessaly, B. c. 352. To support Lycophron, the Phocians sent Phayllus, with a PHILIPPUS. 27.5 force of 7000 men, but he was defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, who followed up this success with the capture of Pagasae, the port of Pherae. Soon, however, Philip was himself obliged to retreat into Macedonia, after two battles with Onomarchus, who had marched into Thessaly against him with a more numerous army ; but his retreat was only a preliminary to a more vigorous effort. He shortly returned with augmented forces, ostentatiously assuming the character of champion of the Delphic god and avenger of sacrilege, and making his soldiers wear crowns of laurel. One battle, in which the Phocians were defeated and Onomarchus himself was slain, gave Philip the as- cendancy in Thessaly. He established at Pherae what he wished the Greeks to consider a free go- vernment, but he took and garrisoned Magnesia, and then advanced southward to Thermopylae. The pass, however, he found guarded by a strong Athenian force, and he was compelled, or at least thought it expedient to retire, a step by which in- deed he had nothing to lose and much to gain, since the Greek states were unconsciously playing into his hands by a war in which they were weakening one another, and he had other plans to prosecute in the North. But while he withdrew his army from Greece, he took care that the Athenians should suffer annoyance from his fleet. With this Lemnos and Imbros were attacked, and some of the inha- bitants were carried off as prisoners, several Athe- nian ships with valuable cargoes were taken near Geraestns, and the Paralus was captured in the bay of Marathon. These events are mentioned by Demosthenes, in his first Philippic (p. 49, ad fin,), delivered in b. c. 352, but are referred to the period immediately following the fall of Olynthus, b. c. 347, by those who consider the latter portion of the speech in question as a distmct oration of later date [Demosthenes]. It was to the affairs of Thrace that Philip now directed his operations. As the ally of Amadocus against Cersobleptes (Theo- pomp. ap. Harpocr. s. v. 'A^uaSo/cos), he marched into the country, established his ascendancy there, and brought away one of the sons of the Thracian king as a hostage [see Vol. I. p. 674]. Meanwhile, his movements in Thessaly had opened the eyes of Demosthenes to the real danger of Athens and Greece, and his first Philippic (delivered, as we have remarked, about this time) was his earliest attempt to rouse his countrymen to energetic efforts against their enemy. But the half-century, which had elapsed since the Peloponnesian war, had worked a sad change in the Athenians, and energy was no longer their characteristic. Reports of Philip's illness and death in Thrace amused and soothed the people, and furnished them with a wel- come excuse for inaction ; and, though the intelli- gence of his having attacked Heraeum on the Pro- pontis excited their alarm and a momentaiy show of vigour, still nothing effectual was done, and throughout the greater part of B. c. 351 feebleness and irresolution prevailed. At some period in the course of the two following years Philip would seem to have interposed in the affairs of Epeirus, dethroning Arymbas (if we may depend on the statement of Justin, which is in some measure borne out by Demosthenes), and transferring the crown to Alexander, the brother of Olympias (Just, vii. 6, viii. 6 ; Dem. Olynth. i. p. 13; comp. Diod. xvi. 72 ; Wess. ad loc.). About the same time also he showed at least one symptom of his designs T 2
