SYUACUSAE. redoults or forts, each of them occupied ■(vith a strong carrison, at intervals along the sloping pla- teau of Epipolae, while a fort had been also erected at the important post of Euryalus, at the extreme angle of the heights. (Thuc. vii. 43.) So strong indeed was their position that Demosthenes despaired of carrying it by day, and resolved upon a night attack, in which he succeeded in carrying the fort at Euryalus, but was foiled in his attempt upon the other outworks, and repulsed with heavy loss. {lb. 43—45.) The failure of this attack was considered by De- mosthenes himself as decisive, and he ad'ised the im- mediate abandonment of the siege. But the contrary advice of Nicias prevailed ; and even when increasing sickness in the Athenian camp had induced him also to consent to a retreat, his superstitious fears, excited by an eclipse of the moon, again caused them to postpone their departure. The consequences were ftital. The Syracusans now became rather the be- siegers than the besieged, attacked the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbour, and cut off and de- stroyed the wh"le of their right wing under Eury- mcdon, in the bay of Dascon. Elated with this success, they sought nothing less than the captiu'e of the whole armament, and began to block up the mouth of the Gi-eat Harbour, from Ortygia across to J'leinmyrium, by mooring vessels across it. The Athenians were now compelled to abandon all their outposts and lines on the heights, and draw together their troops as close to the naval camp as possible; while they made a final effort to break through the iKirrier at the entrance of the harbour. But this attempt proved unsuccessful, and led to a complete (leieat of the Athenian fleet. There was now no course but to retreat. The army under Nicias and Dt'iiiosthenes broke up from its camp, and at first directed their course along the valley of the Anapus, till they came to a narrow pass, commanded by a jiiecipitous ridge called the Acraean Rock (^'AKpalov AeVas, Thuc. vii. 78), which had been occupied in f jrce by the Syracusans. Failing in forcing this defile, the Athenians changed their line of retreat, and followed the road to Helorus, but alter forcing in succession, though not without heavy loss, the ]i:issage of the two rivers Cacyparis and Erineus, and reaching the banks of the Asinarus, the last survivors of the Athenian army were compelled to lay down their arms. The whole number of pri- .>- oners was said to amount to 7000. A trophy was iTci'ted by the Syracusans on the bank of the Asi- narus, and a festival called the Asinaria instituted t" commemorate their victory. (Thuc. vii. 78 — 87; Diod.xiii. 18, 19.) The failure of the Athenian expedition against Syracuse seemed likely to secure to that city the uu(juestionable superiority among the Greek colonies ill Sicily. But a new and formidable power now aiipeared — the Carthaginians, who were invited by the Segestans to support them against the Selinun- tines, but who, not content with the destruction of Si'linus and Himera (p.. c. 410), and with that of Aurigentum (u. c. 40G), pushed forward their fdnijuests with a view of making themselves mas- ters of the whole island. Dionysius, then a young man, took advantage of the alarm and excitement caused by this danger to raise himself to des- jiotic power at Syracuse (b. c. 405), and he soon after concluded a peace with the Carthaginians, whose career of victory had been checked by a pesti- lence. The history of the reign of Dionysius at SYEACUSAK. 1059 Syracuse, which continued for a period of 38 years (b. c. 405 — 387), cannot be here related : it is briefly given in the Bloyr. Diet, art. Diomysius, and very fully in Grote's History of Greece, vols. x. and xi. ; but its influence and effects upon the city itself must be here noticed. From a very early period he turned his attention to the strengthening and fortification of the city, and constructed great works, partly with a view to the defence of the city against external inva- sion, partly for the security of his own power. One of his first operations was to convert the island of Ortygia into a strong fortress, by surrounding it with a lofty wall, fortified vvith numerous towers, especially on the side where it adjoined the land, where he raised a .strongly fortified front, called the Penta- pyla; while, for still further' security, he constructed an interior fort or citadel within the island, which became the acropolis of Syracuse, and at the same time the residence of Dionysius and his successors in the despotism. Adjoining this he constructed within the lesser port, or Portus Lacceius, docks for his ships of war on a large scale, so as to be capable of receiving 60 triremes: while they were enclosed with a wall, and accessible only by a narrow en- trance. But not content with this, he a few years afterwards added docks for 160 more ships, within the Great Port, in the recess or bight of it which approaches most nearly to the Portus Lacceius, and opened a channel of communication between the two. At the same time he adorned the part of the city immediately outside the island with porticoes and public buildings for the convenience of the citizens. (Diod. xiv. 7.) But his greatest work of all was the line of walls with which he fortified the heights of Epipolae. The events of the Athenian siege had sufBciently proved the vital importance of these to the safety of the city; and hence before Dionysius engaged in his great war with Carthage he deter- mined to secure their possession by a line of perma- nent fortifications. The walls erected for this pur- pose along the northern edge of the cliffs of Epi]iolae (extending from near Sta Panarjia to the hill of P^uryalus, or M ongihelUsi) were 30 stadia in length, and are said to have been erected by the labour of the whole body of the citizens in the sliort space of 20 days. (Diod. xiv. 18.) It is remarkable that we hear nothing of the construction of a similar wall along the southern edge of the plateau of J^pi- polae; though the table-land is at least as accessible on this side as on the other; and a considerable suburb called Neapolis had already grown up on this side (Diod. xiv. 9), outside of the wall of Achradina, and extending over a considerable part of the slope, which descends from the Tenienitis towards the marshy plain of the Anapus. But whatever may have been tiie cause, it seems certain that Syracuse continued till a later period to be but imperfectly fortified on this side. The importance of the additional defences erected by Dionysius was sufficiently shown in the course of the war with Carthage which began in B. c. 397. In that war Dionysius at first carried his arms successfully to the western extremity of Sicily, but fortune soon turned against him, and he was compelled in his turn to shut himself up within the walls of Syracuse, and trust to the strength of his fortifications. The Carthaginian general Hi- milco entered the Great Port with his fleet, and established his head-quarters at the Olympicum, while ho not only ravaged the country outside the walls, but made himself master of one of the suburbs, 3 Y 2
