resumed his place at the India office—an event which caused some surprise, as his relations with the leader of his party had long been of the coldest nature. In the later years of the administration these became, however, much more cordial, and Salisbury paid a sympathetic tribute to Beaconsfield on the occasion of the latter's death on 19 April 1881. His conviction and commonsense had, meanwhile, been brought once more into contrast with the opportunism of the prime minister on the introduction of the public worship regulation bill (1874), when Disraeli played upon the protestant sentiment of the country and took occasion to describe his colleague, who had shown a just appreciation of the futility of the proposed measure, as 'a great master of gibes and flouts and jeers.' It was in criticising this bill that Salisbury defined his conception of the Church of England, over whose establishment and privileges he was ever on the guard. 'There are,' he said, 'three schools in the church, which I might designate by other names, but which I prefer to call the sacramental, the emotional, and the philosophical. . . . They arise, not from any difference in the truth itself, but because the truth must necessarily assume different tints as it is refracted through the different media of various minds. But it is upon the frank and loyal tolerance of these schools that the existence of your establishment depends.'
At the India office Salisbury's administration was marked by his refusal to check the export of corn during the famine in Bengal, contrary to the advice of the lieut.-governor, Sir George Campbell [q. v. Suppl. I]. 'The difficulty,' he told the House of Lords, was 'not to procure grain but to bring the supplies to the houses of the starving population.' The event justified his policy. In this case Lord Northbrook [q. v. Suppl. II], the governor-general, had seen eye to eye with him, but there was a difference of opinion between them about the advisability of appointing a mixed commission to try the Gaikwar of Baroda, which Northbrook aggravated by altering some of the customs duties without reference to the secretary of state. Afghan frontier policy proved a more serious source of fricti6n. Northbrook belonged to the old 'Lawrence' school of administrators, who were satisfied with the existing north-west frontier, and desired to avoid interference with the Amir. Salisbury, on the other hand, was of opinion that 'a diplomatic invasion' of Afghanistan by Russia was taking place, and must be resisted by the establishment of a British agent at Herat. This 'forward policy' was inaugurated by Lytton, who replaced Northbrook in April 1876. Salisbury defended it, as well as his personal integrity in respect of it, in a speech in the House of Lords on 10 Dec. 1878. Of a Russian military invasion of India he made light, advising one who feared it 'to use large maps' (11 June 1877). But he maintained that, unless we took our precautions, there was a danger that the Russians might at some convenient moment prompt the Afghans to embarrass us upon the frontier :— 'Russia can offer to the Afghans the loot of India ; we, if we desired to make a competing offer, can promise nothing—because there is nothing in Turkestan to loot' (Quarterly Review, April 1881, p. 548).
It was not, however, from the India office that he was principally to oppose Russian designs and to win in the Tsar's eyes the character of being '1'ennemi acharné de la Russie' (Life of Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 719). The Eastern question, owing to a rebellion attended by Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria and the adjacent provinces, had become acute in 1876, and a conference between the great powers was arranged to meet in Constantinople. Salisbury was. sent out in December as British plenipotentiary. His purpose was to secure so far as possible both the integrity of Turkey and the safety of its Christian subjects. Instead of any occupation of Bulgaria by Russia he brought the Powers to agree upon the appointment of an international commission to re-organise the territory with the support of six thousand Belgian troops, in the intention of placing it, together with Bosnia and the Herzegovina, under the control of governors nominated by the Sultan and approved by the Concert. To these terms, however, the Porte obstinately and unexpectedly refused its assent, and Salisbury returned to England in the end of Jan. 1877. War between Russia and Turkey followed in April, and the Russians were within reach of Constantinople by the end of the year. On 6 Dec. Cranbrook records in his diary, 'Salisbury is bent upon England having a share, if there should be a break up in the East, and evidently has no desire that Turkey should stand.' The treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), however, put Russia clearly in the wrong, inasmuch as it was a violation of the integrity of Turkey, guaranteed by England, France, and Austria in 1856. The British govern-
