of the sovereignty of France by Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of 2 Dec. 1851, and the hazard of a French invasion, made this a matter of urgent anxiety. From this time onwards he made himself intimately acquainted with every detail both of the naval and military resources of the kingdom, and used every effort to have them put upon a satisfactory footing. Earnestly as he loved and had wrought for peace, the condition of Europe was such that he knew well it could not settle down into a state of enduring tranquillity until after many questions had been settled by the arbitrament of the sword. When a rupture might take place, or how it might affect England, it was impossible to foresee, but safety could lie only in the consciousness that it was well prepared. On the death of the great duke (14 Dec.) he made the measures for insuring this safety his peculiar care, and his counsels were eagerly sought by Lord Hardinge, the duke's successor, from the consciousness that no one had stored up such exact information as the prince, or was more skilful in suggesting how defects might be remedied or existing resources turned to the best account.
Apprehension of danger on the side of France soon died out before the evident anxiety of its new emperor to cultivate the friendship of England. This was so obviously his interest, and the assurance of internal peace was of such vital moment to France at this moment, that credit was given, if not to his good will, at least to his necessities. But already an uneasy feeling was abroad as to the hostile intentions of Russia towards Turkey, to which England could not be indifferent. The country, therefore, was well pleased when a government combining apparently all the elements of strength was formed under Lord Aberdeen, and it saw with satisfaction the efforts which were made to put both the forces upon a more satisfactory footing. On the prince's suggestion a camp for the training of troops to the incidents of life in the field was formed at Chobham Common. He also pressed on the government the idea of a permanent camp of instruction, which ultimately led to the establishment of the camp at Aldershot. The prince paid frequent visits during 1853 to the camp at Chobham, and watched the training of the troops for the work of actual warfare, in which its preparatory discipline was soon afterwards to be tested. The spectacle also (11 Aug. 1863) of a review at Spithead of 'the finest fleet, perhaps, which England ever fitted out, forty ships of war of all kinds, all moved by steam except three,' gave him intense satisfaction. 'I speak of it,' he writes to Stockmar (16 Aug.), 'because last autumn we were bewailing our defenceless state, and because I must rejoice to see that achieved which I had struggled so long and hard to effect.' The feeling was. natural, as he saw that England was at this time drifting into war with Russia. He had never been deceived, as Lord Aberdeen had been, into trusting Russia's protestations. 'We must deal with our enemies as honourable men,' he writes to Stockmar (27 Sept.), 'and deal honourably towards them; but that is no reason why we should think they are so in fact; this is what Aberdeen does, and maintains that it is right to do.' The prince was alive to the danger of not letting the Emperor Nicholas see betimes that his designs of aggrandisement were seen through, and, if persisted in, would bring England into the field. The vacillating policy of Lord Aberdeen pained him; but so little was the prince's character then understood that the most bitter attacks were made against him as sympathising with the schemes of Russian ambition, and as an evil influence working behind the throne to thwart the policy in her majesty's government. So far were these carried that it was for a time currently believed that he had been impeached for treason and committed to the Tower. These calumnies had the good effect of forcing from ministers, both past and present, on the meeting of parliament (31 Jan. 1854), the fullest vindication of the way in which the prince had used his position as the nearest friend and private secretary of the queen, not only within strictly constitutional limits, but also to the great advantage of the nation. From this time that position was rightly understood, and successive governments eagerly availed themselves of his information, experience, and sagacity on questions of great national importance.
Throughout the Crimean war and in the arrangement of the terms of peace these were found to be of the greatest value. By none were they more frankly recognised than by Lord Palmerston, who had been at one time by no means predisposed to regard the prince with favour. 'Till my present position,' he said to a friend some time after he had become premier in 1865, 'gave me so many opportunities of seeing his royal highness, I had no idea of his possessing such eminent qualities as he has, and how fortunate it has been for the country that the queen married such a prince.' In the remaining years of the prince's life Lord Palmerston found increasing reasons for the opinion thus expressed. They were years of great anxiety, in consequence of the state
