ties of the situation were greatly increased by the individuality of Lord Ellenborough, who had recently assumed the governor-generalship. Lord Ellenborough had studied Indian questions as president of the board of control, and had formed an exaggerated view of the weakness and defects of the company's government. Arriving in India at a juncture when the Indian administration seemed stunned and paralysed by the loss of the greater portion of the army in Afghanistan, he found himself in hopeless discord with many a time-honoured institution and recognised principle of Indian administration. Sir George Arthur had before his appointment to Bombay won the confidence of Lord Ellenborough, which he never afterwards lost. Still, to avoid friction with the government of India under such circumstances was not easy, and it is much to Sir George Arthur's credit that during that brief but eventful period he succeeded in retaining the esteem of the court of directors and of his own colleagues in the government of Bombay, as well as that of Lord Ellenborough, who recorded the name of Sir George Arthur upon a monument which he erected in England to those who had best seconded his efforts for the maintenance and extension of the British empire in India.
It would be beyond the scope of this memoir to discuss the policy of Lord Ellenborough in connection with Afghanistan. Sir George Arthur was entirely opposed to the measure, at one time contemplated by the governor-general, of withdrawing the garrisons from Candahar and Jellalabad without striking a blow for the rescue of the prisoners in the hands of the Afghans, or for the reestablishment of our military reputation. Eventually the beleaguered garrison of Jellalabad was relieved, Cabul was reoccupied, the captives were released, and conclusive proof was afforded that it was not owing to want of power that we evacuated Afghanistan and allowed Dost Mahomed to return as ruler to the realm from which he had been driven.
The withdrawal of the troops from Candahar involved the return of the Bombay portion of the Candahar garrison through Sind, and was followed in the course of a few months by the annexation of that country and the deposition of its rulers, the Talpur amirs. Sir Charles Napier, then commanding a division of the Bombay army, had been selected by the governor-general to command the troops in Sind. He arrived in that country greatly prejudiced against the amirs. Nearly the whole of the troops in Sind belonged to the Bombay army, the general commanding was a major-general on the staff of that army, and up to that time the troops in Sind had been practically as well as theoretically under the orders of the government of Bombay; but from the date of Sir Charles Napier's appointment to the Sind command the governor-general departed from the established practice of sending orders through the government of Bombay, and entered into a direct correspondence with Sir Charles Napier. Such a state of things could hardly have failed under any circumstances to produce official and departmental friction, even if the policy of the governor-general and of the general commanding in Sind had been in accordance with the views of the Bombay authorities and of the court of directors. But the reverse was the fact, and the antagonism was intensified by the differences which arose between Sir Charles Napier and Major (afterwards Sir James) Outram. Throughout this embarrassing juncture Sir George Arthur kept himself studiously aloof from all personal partisanship, and, ignoring the irregularity of Lord Ellenborough's proceedings, rendered a loyal obedience to the decisions of the governor-general and a cordial and energetic support to Sir Charles Napier in his difficult task of establishing British rule in Sind; whilst he retained the respect and esteem of Outram and of the many other Indian officials who regarded the annexation of Sind as an unjustifiable act.
The military operations against Gwalior, which took place not long before the close of Lord Ellenborough's government, indirectly affected the presidency of Bombay by leading to an outbreak of hostilities in Kolapur, a small southern Mahratta state, the head of which was closely connected by marriage with Gwalior. The suppression of this insurrection, which, but for Sir George Arthur's judicious and prompt measures, might have assumed serious proportions, and that at a time when so large a portion of the Bombay army was employed in Sind, was by no means an easy task.
Lord Ellenborough, having been recalled by the court of directors, was succeeded by Sir Henry Hardinge, upon whom it devolved in the succeeding year to repel the invasion of British India by the Sikhs, The arduous struggle which then took place, when the governor-general deemed it his duty to offer his services to the commander-in-chief as second in command, led Sir H. Hardinge to recommend to the home authorities the appointment of a provisional governor-general. His choice fell upon Sir George Arthur, and, the recommendation having been approved by the court of directors and the ministry,
