translation made by John Scotus Erigena. St. Augustine worked out the method more systematically in his treatise on the Trinity (lib. viii. c. 3), but not with such completeness and precision as Anselm, whose treatise is one close and compact chain of reasoning, every link being, so to speak, tightly fastened to that which precedes and follows it. Starting from the contemplation of sensible objects, he propounds the question whether the goodness in all good things, although known by different names, such as justice in a man, strength or swiftness in a horse, and so on, comes from one source or divers. All varieties of excellence, by whatever name they may be called, are resolvable at last into a few simple elements—the good, the beautiful, the great, the useful. Hence he arrives at the conclusion that all things to which any of these qualities in various degrees and forms are attributed must derive them from something which is in itself always the same, which is in itself absolutely and unchangeably good and great. As also there is a difference in natures, some being better than others, as a horse is superior to a dog, and a man to a horse, there must be one nature so superior to all others that it cannot be exceeded by any; otherwise there would be no end to the series, which is absurd. This supreme nature must be the author of its own existence: it must be ‘per se’ and ‘ex se,’ ‘by means of itself’ and ‘from itself;’ it must be ‘per se,’ for if it was by means of another that other would be the greater, which is contrary to the supposition; if it were out of nothing, then it must be brought out of nothing either by itself or by another; not by itself, for then itself would be prior to itself, which is absurd, nor by another, for then it would not be the highest nature of all. In this way he proves the eternal self-existence of the divine nature. And by similar rigorously logical methods he goes on to prove the existence and nature of the Word, and the Holy Spirit.
In the ‘Proslogion,’ so called because it is in the form of an address to God, he endeavours to prove the existence of the Deity by a shorter method—by a single deductive argument instead of a lengthened inductive chain. He had long been anxious, he says, to discover such an argument, and vexed that it continually eluded him, until at last, to his great joy, it was suddenly revealed to him. The point of departure in this case was not the contemplation of the outer but of the inner world, not of sensible objects but of the mind of man. He could prove, he thought, the being of a God out of the very saying of the fool that there was no God. That very denial involved the idea of a Being than whom no greater can be conceived; but if no greater can be conceived, then He must exist, since existence is a necessary point of perfection. This is substantially the argument which was employed by Descartes six hundred years afterwards, although there is no evidence that Descartes had any knowledge of Anselm's writings. Leibnitz, however, is inclined to suspect that he had, because he thinks that both in the style and matter of Descartes' writings he detects a larger obligation to other authors than Descartes chose to acknowledge (Epist. ad Bierlingium, 1710, v. 361, 393). It is to be noted that neither Anselm nor Descartes seeks to prove the existence of God in order to produce belief, but, starting from belief as a fact, their aim is to show that reason independently followed necessarily confirms the convictions of faith. It is remarkable that in the period between Anselm and Descartes no one seems to have adopted the same method. Anselm cannot properly be considered as the first or forerunner of the schoolmen; their method was not Platonic, but Aristotelian, a method far better adapted than Anselm's to the ordinary mind of the middle ages. In boldness, indeed, and originality of thought, Anselm was too far ahead of the intellectual standard of his day to be thoroughly understood or appreciated. The aim of the ‘Cur Deus Homo?’ is to prove the necessity of the incarnation as the only means whereby the debt of obedience due from man to God could be discharged, an adequate reparation made for his offences, and the immortality of body and soul recovered for which he was originally destined. Unlike the other two treatises, it is in the form of a dialogue, which renders it easier reading, although the reasoning is not less close and cogent. There is no apparent lack of finish in the work, although Anselm in his preface says that he should have made several additions if he could have secured some quiet leisure, but that it was begun in England amidst great distress of heart—‘in magna cordis tribulatione’—and finished during his sojourn in the province of Capua.
If his philosophical treatises exhibit the profundity, the daring originality, and masterly grasp of his intellect, his meditations and prayers reveal the spiritual side of his nature, the deep humility of his faith, and the fervour of his love towards God, while his letters show him in his more human aspect—his tender sympathy and affection, his courtesy and respectfulness, combined
