checkmated on every point, the Jacobites acquiesced without even a murmur in the accession of George I. Argyll was made groom of the stole, nominated one of the members of the regency, and appointed general and commander-in-chief of the king's forces in Scotland. In this capacity he was entrusted with the difficult task of crushing the Jacobite rising in Scotland in the following year. In view of this event, the choice of him was a most fortunate one, for probably no one else could have dealt with the crisis so successfully. His military reputation was second only to that of Marlborough, but of as much importance as this was his general popularity in Scotland, and the large personal following from his own clans. In the measures which he took for coping with dangers threatening him on all sides, he displayed an energy which created confidence almost out of despair. Leaving London on 9 Sept., he reached Edinburgh on the 14th, and, having taken measures for its defence, set out for Stirling, where the government forces, numbering only about 1,800, had taken up their position under General Wightman. The rapid concentration of reinforcements from Glasgow and other towns at Stirling caused the Earl of Mar, with the Jacobite followers he had raised in the highlands, to hesitate in marching southwards, and in order to reinforce the body of insurgents who were gathering in the southern lowlands, he deemed it advisable to send a portion of his large force across the Forth from Fife. After concentrating at Haddington, they resolved to make a dash at Edinburgh, but an urgent messenger having informed Argyll, at Stirling, of the critical condition of affairs, he immediately set out with three hundred dragoons and two hundred foot soldiers mounted on horses, lent them for the occasion, and entered the West Port just as the insurgents were nearing the eastern gate. Foiled in their attempt on Edinburgh, the insurgents marched southwards to Leith, where they seized on the citadel, but recognising the desperate character of the enterprise, they evacuated it during the night, and, after various irresolute movements in the south of Scotland, crossed into England. Thus, so far as Scotland was concerned, the only result of Mar's stratagem was to weaken his own forces in the highlands. Scarcely had the insurgents taken their midnight flight from Leith, when news reached Argyll that Mar had broken up his camp at Perth, and was on the march to force the passage at Stirling. The movement proved, however, to be a mere feint, to attract Argyll away from the Jacobite movements in the south. Mar, after making a demonstration, retreated to Auchterarder, and finally again fell back on Perth. After remaining there for some months, seemingly awaiting the development of events in the south, he finally began a southward movement in earnest, whereupon Argyll, who had kept himself fully informed of all his procedure, crossed over Stirling bridge, and marching northwards anticipated him by arriving on the heights above Dunblane just as the insurgent army was nearing Sheriffmuir, an elevated plateau formed by a spur of the Ochils. The two armies remained on the opposite eminences under arms during the night, and in the grey dawn of Sunday morning, 13 Nov., the wild followers of Mar, numbering about twelve thousand to the four thousand under Argyll, swept down from the heights across the morass, in front of the moor, threatening to engulf the small army of Argyll, which now began to ascend the acclivity of the moor on the opposite side. The conformation of the ground concealed the two armies for a time from each other, and thus it happened that as they came to close quarters, it was found that they had partly missed each other, the left of each army being outflanked. Argyll's left, hopelessly outnumbered, fled in confusion to Dunblane, but the right and centre resisted the impetuous but partial attack of the highlanders with great steadiness, and as the highlanders recoiled from the first shock of resistance, Argyll, not giving them time to recover, charged them so opportunely with his cavalry that their hesitation was at once changed into headlong flight. Thus the right of both armies was completely victorious, but in neither case could they bring assistance to the left, so as to turn the fortune of the fight into decided victory. Mar's want of success could only be attributed to incompetent generalship, while Argyll was saved from overwhelming disaster rather by a happy accident than by special skill in his dispositions. As it was, he reaped from his partial defeat all the practical benefits of a brilliant victory. Technically he was indeed victorious, for Mar was present with the insurgents who were defeated, and those of the insurgents who were victorious having lost communication with their general, made no effort to prevent Argyll from enjoying the victor's privilege of occupying the field of battle. Notwithstanding his boastful proclamations, Mar also gradually realised that he had been completely checkmated, and ultimately sent a message to Argyll as to his power to grant terms. Desirous of ending the insurrection without further bloodshed, Argyll asked the government for powers to treat, but no notice was taken of his
