anecdotes of his predecessors in office, that I am afraid his feelings upon these subjects have become somewhat blunted' (Hansard, 13 July 1857). No sooner had it appeared than Lord St. Leonards, who incidentally suffered from the biographer's inaccuracy, published an indignant pamphlet in his own defence, 'Misrepresentations in Campbell's Lives of Lyndhurst and Brougham, corrected by St. Leonards.' Brougham's story, as told by himself, has since been published (1871); and the life of Lyndhurst has been rewritten by Sir Theodore Martin (1883) (see also 2nd edition of Sidney Gibson's Memoir of Lord Lyndhurst).
In 1846, when the whigs returned, Campbell had hopes of being restored to the Irish chancellorship; but in deference to Irish feeling it was decided that the office should be held, as it has ever since been held, by an Irishman, and Campbell was made instead chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with a seat in the cabinet. He had meanwhile been playing a leading part in the House of Lords. 'Edinburgh,' said Brougham, with his usual exaggeration, 'is now celebrated for having given us the two greatest bores that have ever yet been known in London, for Jack Campbell in the House of Lords is just what Tom Macaulay is in private society.' He had certainly very little oratorical fervour, and, as one may judge from 'Hansard,' he was often tedious; but the opinions of a man so shrewd and experienced always commanded attention. The passing of several important measures during this period was greatly owing to his exertions, the most important of them being the Copyright Act of 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45); the Libel Act of 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), known as Lord Campbell's Act, and drafted by himself with the assistance of Starkie, the well-known text writer on the law of libel and slander; and an act of 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93), also known as Lord Campbell's Act, which did away with the rule that where a person was killed by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, no action for damages could be brought by his representatives. Lord Denman's health breaking down in 1849, Campbell received assurances that he would be made chief justice, and he applied himself to the study of the recent changes in legal procedure. Much delay occurred; Denman, resenting several uncomplimentary references to himself in Campbell's 'Lives,' was unwilling to resign in his favour (Arnould, Life of Denman, ii. 288); and it was not till March 1850 that the appointment was actually made. His judicial labours mainly filled up his subsequent life; but he still took a share in legal debates and in legislation. In 1851 he succeeded at length in passing the Registration Bill through the lords, a measure which, he says in his journal, 'ought to immortalise me,' but it came to grief in the commons. He joined in the opposition to the Wensleydale life peerage, preparing himself for the debate as usual by reading 'all that had been written on the subject.' He presided over the committee to inquire into the question of divorce, and saw their recommendations carried into effect by the Divorce and Matrimonial Act of 1857. And he left yet another Lord Campbell's Act on the statute-book, the Obscene Publications Act of 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 83). His literary schemes had to be abandoned; but he spent the autumn of 1858 at Hartrigge, an estate in Roxburghshire, which he had purchased some years before, in reading through Shakespeare to see 'whether the bard of Avon, before he left Stratford, had not been an attorney's clerk.' The pamphlet in which he discusses the question (published in the form of a letter to J. Payne Collier) convinced Macaulay that Shakespeare had some legal training, Campbell himself inclining to the same belief, though he declined to give a decided opinion.
Lord Campbell the judge is a more pleasing figure than Lord Campbell the author. He had his failings, it would seem, even on the bench, showing, for example, somewhat too openly an unworthy love of applause. But he did not debase his talents by hurried work. He was ambitious to leave behind him the reputation of a sound lawyer, and by aid of his wide knowledge, his long experience, his untiring industry, and his natural strength of intellect, he succeeded. Though changes in procedure have rendered obsolete many of the cases in which he took part, there remains a solid body of law connected with his name. His decisions, some of them in 'leading cases' (such as Humphries v. Brogden), are constantly cited, and his opinion still carries weight. For his House of Lords cases see Cl. & F. from vol. viii.; and his privy council cases, Moore from vol. iii.; his civil cases as chief justice are reported in 1-9 E. & B., E. B. & E., 1 & 2 E. & E., and 12-18 Q. B.; his criminal cases in 3-8 Cox, and in Bell's, Dearsly's, and Dearsly and Bell's Crown Cases. Among his causes célèbres were Achilli's action against Newman (1852), and the trials of Palmer (1856) and Bernard (1858).
When the liberal party regained power in 1859, great difficulty was experienced in deciding who should be chancellor. There were several rivals for the honour, each with
