politics one must always speak the truth. Burke, in his ‘Regicide Peace,’ referred to it as a marvellous example of the way in which mutual interest and candour could overcome obstructive regulations and delays.
The festivities at The Hague in honour of the treaty included a ball given by De Witt and opened by the Prince of Orange; the English plenipotentiary was eclipsed on this occasion by the grand pensionary, but obtained his revenge next day at a tennis match. The rejoicings in England were less effusive, but Pepys characterised the treaty as the ‘glory of the present reign,’ while Dryden afterwards held Shaftesbury up to special execration for having loosed ‘the triple bond.’
Ostensibly the triple alliance aimed merely at the guarantee by neutral powers of terms which Louis had already offered to Spain, but which it was apprehended that he meant to withdraw and replace by far more onerous ones. There were, however, four secret articles, by which England and the United Provinces pledged themselves to support Spain against France if that power deferred a just peace too long. Burnet—though, like Pepys, he called the treaty the masterpiece of Charles II's reign—was ignorant of the secret articles; and contemporary critics were also ignorant of the fact that the day after the signature Charles wrote to his sister, Henriette d'Orléans, to excuse his action in the eyes of the French king on the plea of momentary necessity (Dalrymple, i. 68; Baillon, Henriette Anne, 1886, p. 301). Clifford, in fact, when he remarked ‘For all this joy we must soon have another war with Holland,’ accurately expressed the views of his master, who found in Temple's diplomacy a convenient and respectable cloak for his own very different designs, including at no distant date the signal humiliation of the Dutch. Having regard to the sequel, it is plain that Temple was rather more of a passive instrument in the hands of the thoroughly unsympathetic Charles than Macaulay and others, who have idealised his achievement, would lead us to suppose. It is true that he was for guiding our diplomacy in the direction which it took with such success some twenty years later, and time and experience eventually approved his policy. But although the popular voice acclaimed his attempt to rehabilitate the balance of power in Europe, it is by no means so clear that in 1668 English interests lay in supporting Holland against France (cf. Mem. de Gourville, ap. Michaud, 3rd ser. v. 544; Mignet, ii. 495, iii. 50; Seeley, Growth of British Policy, 1895).
In February 1668, the treaty having been accomplished, Temple left The Hague to return to Brussels. In view of a possible rupture with France some preliminary discussion was entered upon as to a junction of the English, Spanish, and Dutch fleets, and some trouble was anticipated by Temple in consequence of the English pretension to be saluted in the narrow seas, which Charles would not hear of abating one jot; but mobilisation proved unnecessary. There was some talk of Temple being offered a secretaryship, but to his great relief the offer was not made, and he was sent on as envoy extraordinary to Aix-la-Chapelle, where the provisions indicated by the triple alliance were embodied in the definitive treaty on 8 May 1668. Whether or no the secret pact was the cause of Louis's disgorging Franche-Comté, which his armies had overrun, there is no doubt that the credit of England abroad had been raised by Temple's energy, and on his way to and from Aix he was hailed by salutes and banquets.
Having spent two months in England, Temple took leave of the king on 8 Aug. 1668, and proceeded as English ambassador to The Hague, with a salary of 7l. a day. By the king's desire he took special pains to combat the reserve of the Prince of Orange, and he soon wrote in glowing terms to his court of the prince's sense, honesty, and promise of pre-eminence. In August 1669, in his private capacity, he successfully mediated in a pecuniary dispute between Holland and Portugal (Bulstrode Papers, p. 112). During 1670 was imposed upon him the ungrateful task of demanding the surrender of Cornet George Joyce [q. v.] The magistrates at Rotterdam did not openly refuse, but they evaded the request, and in the interval Joyce escaped (Ludlow, Memoirs, 1894, ii. 425). No less difficult were the negotiations in the direction of an equitable ‘marine treaty,’ and Temple had also on his hands a design for including Spain in a quadruple alliance. But the simultaneous French intrigue on the part of Charles caused all Temple's zeal to be regarded with increasing suspicion and dislike at home, while his friends Bridgeman, Trevor, and Ormonde were frowned upon, and finally left unsummoned to the foreign committee. When Louis overran Lorraine, and Charles made no sign, even Temple's friend De Witt could scarcely refrain from expressing cynical views as to the stability of English policy. The position was becoming untenable for an avowed friend of Holland. The English ministers still hesitated to take so pronounced a step as to recall their minister; but during this summer Temple re-
